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In recent years, a string of high profile corporate scandals like those of Global Crossing, En-
ron, Tyco, and Worldcom has brought securities fraud and corporate governance to the forefront
of public attention and policy debate. The magnitude of the alleged securities fraud is stunning.
According to Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Cornerstone Research, 224 secu-
rities lawsuits in 2002 in the United States were associated with a total $206 billion loss of market
capitalization in the defendant firms.1 The governance crisis was followed by rapid and substantial
legislative and regulatory changes that aimed to restor investor confidence in the capital markets.
The movement was so fast that 9 months after the Enron debacle, President Bush signed the
Sarbanes-Oxley bill into law.
Securities fraud is a very serious issue. It undermines a core value in capital markets, the
integrity of public companies, which is essential to investor confidence in those markets and the
efficient allocation of capital. Furthermore, we also observe inefficient investments and serious
value destructions in many fraudulent firms (e.g., Enron, Nortel, eToys), which implies that there
could be large real economic cost associated with fraud. The governance crisis and the on-going
governance reform call for careful economic reflections on what have happened, because the ex-
act nature, significance, and consequences of securities fraud and the economics underlying the
legislative and regulatory changes are still incompletely understood.
This thesis develops an economic framework to characterize the determinants and conse-
quences of securities fraud. I define securities fraud as deliberate and material misrepresentation of
corporate performance, and thus use fraud and misreporting interchangeably. The thesis consists
of a theoretical model of fraud and empirical analysis.
1Cornerstone Research, “Securities Class Action Case Filings 2002: A Year in Review.”
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1.1 Theory of Fraud
The theory part of the thesis builds on Gary Becker’s (1968) economic analysis of crime.
Following Becker’s approach, one can view fraudulent behavior as an economic activity, whose
equilibrium supply depends on a rational calculation of the expected benefits and costs from
engaging in it. Different firms have different propensities to commit fraud because they face
different cost-benefit tradeoffs. In this paper, the benefit from fraud is that financial misreporting
can create (or sustain) short-term market overvaluation of the firm. The cost of fraud is litigation
risk. With some positive probability, fraudulent activities will be uncovered, resulting in a fraud
penalty (which includes both explicit monetary fines and other implicit costs, such as loss of
reputation). Within this framework, the firm’s propensity for fraud, the magnitude of fraud, and
the firm’s investment incentives are analyzed.
The theory demonstrates an interesting link between a firm’s financial disclosure incentive
and its real investment decision. First, financial misreporting can affect the short-term market
valuation of the firm and allow the firm to invest using cheap outside capital. Second, after
committing fraud, the firm has incentive to cover things up. Such incentive can motivate the firm
to strategically use investment to mask fraud and reduce its litigation risk. The basic intuition is
that stochastic cash flows from a new investment can decrease the precision of the firm’s total cash
flow and create inference problems for the market. In sum, investment can affect both the firm’s
ex ante benefit from committing fraud and its ex post probability of being detected. The model
predicts that fraudulent firms tend to overinvest in the sense that they would undertake some
negative NPV projects that destroy shareholder value. In particular, fraud can induce a preference
for risky (in terms of high return volatility) or uncorrelated projects (uncorrelated with the cash
flow from existing assets), because these types of investment can better disguise fraud than others.
The investment distortion can lead to serious value destructions in the firm, which is the real
economic cost of fraud. Furthermore, the cost of inefficiency is borne by not only shareholders
of fraudulent firms but also those of honest firms, because ex ante the market cannot perfectly
distinguish between the two types of firms.
2
The theory further characterizes the firm’s equilibrium disclosure strategy. The model shows
that the firm will honestly reveal performance if its performance is very good or if it is desperately
bad. The former case is associated with low benefit from fraud, and the latter is associated with
high litigation risk. The firm’s propensity to commit fraud and the magnitude of fraud depend on
the nature of the firm’s assets and growth opportunities. The model predicts that fraudulent firms
tend to have high growth potential but experience negative profitability shocks. Growth potential
can positively influence the firm’s payoff from fraud and negatively influence its litigation risk. In
addition, litigation events tend to cluster in certain industries during some specific time period,
because firms’ cost-benefit tradeoffs of fraud are correlated within an industry.
The theory also generates implications about the role of corporate governance in the context
of corporate fraud. The model shows that good corporate governance can increase the likelihood
of fraud detection and thus deter fraud ex ante. However, corporate governance may also fail to
prevent fraud if it is just about aligning the interest of the management with that of incumbent
shareholders. This is because even when such alignment is perfect, fraud can still emerge in
equilibrium.
Finally, the theory demonstrates the effect of the endogenous detection risk on the cross-
sectional variations in firms’ fraud propensities. While the penalty for fraud (at least the explicit
liability provisions) is largely determined by securities laws and thus is exogenous to the firm,
the probability of detection can be influenced by the firm’s endogenous actions (e.g., investment,
disclosure) as well as firm-specific attributes. This endogeneity implies that the detection risk
is more important in determining cross-sectional variations in firms’ fraud propensities than are
penalty provisions. Therefore, without increasing the probability of detection, enhanced liabil-
ity standards alone may achieve only limited deterrence, because firms can undo some effects of
tightened penalty by adjusting their probabilities of getting caught. More important, fraudulent
firms’ incentive to decrease their likelihood of being detected can be a potential source of value
destruction. Therefore, there is a real danger associated with over-regulation.
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1.2 Empirical Investigation of Fraud
I then empirically test some of my key model predictions. Specifically, I examine the effects
of real investment, corporate monitoring, and firm characteristics on a firm’s cost-benefit tradeoff
of committing fraud. The analysis is based on a new hand-compiled fraud data set, which consists
of private securities class action lawsuits filed between 1996 and 2003 against US public companies
with allegations of accounting irregularities.
The next contribution of the paper is methodological. In assessing a firm’s propensity to
commit fraud, we face an identification problem because we only observe detected fraud. A non-
litigated firm can be either an honest firm or an undetected fraudulent firm. This implies that
the probability of a firm committing fraud and the probability of observing the firm as fraudulent
can be very different. This study utilizes statistical methods to control for this problem. In
essence, I model the probability of detected fraud (what we observe) as the product of two latent
probabilities: the probability of committing fraud and the probability of detecting fraud conditional
on fraud occurrence. Then I use econometric methods to back out these two latent probabilities.
Disentangling fraud commitment and fraud detection provides two advantages. First, it allows
me to control for the unobservability of frauds committed but not detected. Second and more
important, it allows me to examine the economics of each probability as well as their interactions.2
Using the above methodology, I examine the link between real investment and the incidence
of fraud. There has been surprisingly little exploration on the relation between corporate fraud
and investment. This is, however, an important issue. We have observed inefficient investments
and serious value destructions in many fraudulent firms (e.g., Enron, Nortel, eToy). Hence, there
can be large real economic cost associated with fraud. Wang (2004) theorizes that fraud can
induce overinvestment incentives for two reasons. First, fraud can create (or sustain) market
overvaluation and decrease the external financing cost of investment. Second, after committing
fraud, the firm has incentive to strategically use investment to mask fraud and decrease its litigation
2In a concurrent paper, Li (2004) uses a simultaneous model with partial observability to analyze the role of the
SEC in detecting fraud.
4
risk. I find evidence that supports this theory. First, I find that the alleged fraudulent firms
on average have larger investment expenditures than a random sample of non-convicted firms
and a sample of size and age matched comparison firms. Second, different types of investment
appear to have differential effects on the probability of fraud detection. Risky investment (e.g.,
investment in R&D) and uncorrelated investment (e.g., diversifying acquisition) tend to decrease
the probability of detection, while straightforward investment (e.g., capital expenditures) and
correlated investment (e.g., focused acquisition) do not. Lastly, different investments also influence
a firm’s propensity to commit fraud differently. This is either because of the way the investments
are financed (e.g., stock-based vs. cash-based acquisitions) or because of the differential litigation
risk they induce. Overall, the empirical results imply that investment is associated with both a
firm’s ex-ante benefit from committing fraud and its ex-post litigation risk, and thus is an important
determinant of the firm’s fraud incentives.
Corporate securities fraud also provides a new and interesting angle to examine the roles of
different corporate monitors in determining firms’ incentives and behavior. Effective monitoring
should increase the probability of uncovering fraudulent corporate activities and discourage fraud
ex ante. I investigate four types of corporate monitors: large shareholders, institutional owners,
independent auditors, and board of directors. I find that the presence of block equity holders
and large institutional ownership are associated with high probability of fraud detection and low
probability of fraud. For example, increasing block ownership by 10% on average tends to increase
the probability of detection by 1% and decrease the probability of fraud by 4%. This supports the
view of enhancing shareholder monitoring in combatting corporate fraud. The roles of independent
auditors and corporate boards seem to be much weaker. I find no evidence that auditors’ opinions
increase the likelihood of fraud detection. There is some weak evidence that reputable independent
auditors and large corporate boards are related to higher likelihood of fraud detection.
The role of insider equity incentives has received a great amount of public attention following
the recent wave of corporate scandals. Several studies have documented that large executive pay
for performance sensitivity is associated with high probability of corporate fraudulent reporting
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(see, e.g., Johnson, Ryan and Tian (2003), Peng and Röell (2004), and Burns and Kedia (2004)).
In this paper, since I separate the probability of fraud from the probability of detected fraud,
I am able to more directly examine the effect of insider equity incentive on a firm’s propensity
to commit fraud. Interestingly, I find a concave relation between the two. When insider equity
incentive is small, the probability of fraud increases as the equity incentive increases. When insider
equity incentive becomes large, the positive relation weakens and eventually reverses. Overall, this
result seems to support the predictions of the agency theory. However, it also implies that equity
incentive can be a double-edged sword when it is used to align managerial and shareholder interests
in dispersedly-owned firms.
Finally, I examine how firm characteristics influence a firm’s cost-benefit tradeoff of engag-
ing in fraud. I find that high growth potential and large external financing need are two important
motivational factors for fraud. Alleged fraudulent firms on average grow much faster than com-
parison firms and have larger portion of the growth supported by external capital. There is also
indirect evidence that fraudulent firms generally experience negative profitability shocks in the
year when fraud begin.
Most existing studies on corporate fraud have focused on the benefit side of the tradeoff.
The literature on earnings management and corporate fraud has provided evidence that managers
misreport corporate performance in order to facilitate external financing activities, to avoid viola-
tions of debt covenants, or to increase performance-related compensation (see, Healy and Wahlen
(1999) for a review). On the cost side of the tradeoff, a few papers have examined the consequences
following the revelation of fraud. For example, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) show that the
revelation of fraud leads to persistent increase in the firm’s cost of capital. Baucus and Baucus
(1997) find that firms convicted for illegal corporate behavior suffer from prolonged poor operating
performance. Gande and Lewis (2005) document significant negative abnormal returns upon the
filing of securities lawsuits. The only paper I know that studies the probability of fraud detection is
Li (2004). Li emphasizes the strategic role of the SEC in detecting corporate fraud, and documents
that a larger SEC budget increases the probability of fraud detection and deters fraud. My paper
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further demonstrates the importance of understanding firm-level economic determinants of fraud
detection and how the detection risk influences its ex-ante propensity to commit fraud. I show
that the probability of detection depends on firms’ investment decisions, the strength of corporate
monitoring, and firm-specific attributes. The cross-sectional variations in the detection risk help
to explain the variations in firms’ fraud propensities.
I also demonstrate the importance of disentangling the probability of committing fraud from
the probability of detecting fraud. Cross-sectional variables can have opposing effects on the two
latent probabilities, and thus can be masked in their overall effect on the incidence of detected fraud.
For example, this paper shows that large institutional ownership is associated with high probability
of fraud detection and low probability of fraud. The effect on detection tends to dominate and
thus we observe a positive relation between institutional ownership and the compound probability
(incidence of detected fraud). This may lead us to draw incorrect inferences. Distinguishing the
probability of fraud from the probability of detected fraud is not only important for understanding
the economics of fraud, but also relevant from a regulatory point of view in setting policies that
deal with fraud.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the basic institutional knowledge
about securities fraud and securities class action litigation. Chapter 3 reviews the related literature.
Chapter 4 develops an analytical model to characterize the economic determinants of corporate
fraud propensity and the real consequences of fraud. Chapter 5 empirically investigate firms’ fraud
incentives and fraud detection. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Securities Fraud & Securities Litigation
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some general knowledge about securities fraud,
securities laws and regulations, and securities litigation. The structure of this chapter is as follows.
Section 2.1 presents a definition of securities fraud, and describes the major anti-fraud laws and
regulations that govern the securities industry. Section 2.2 describes the common types of fraud
allegations in the private securities class action litigation between 1996 and 2002.
2.1 Securities Fraud
A thorough understanding of the nature, significance and consequences of securities fraud
requires a proper definition of securities fraud. Fraud, in general, as defined in Webster’s Universal
College Dictionary, is deceit or trickery perpetrated for profit or to gain some unfair or dishonest
advantage. I define securities fraud as follows based on the description of the SEC and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Securities fraud refers to the use of any manipulative and deceptive devices,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, that are in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors. The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, derivative securities, certificate of interest, or in general, any instrument commonly
known as a security.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated thereunder
(especially Rule 10(b)-5) build the major substance of the broad anti-fraud provisions that make
it unlawful for anyone to engage in fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security. Violations of these provisions include employment of any devices, schemes
or artifice to defraud, misrepresentation and/or omission of material information, or engaging in
any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
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any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. The essence of the above
regulations is to prohibit deliberate and material information misrepresentation in any form of
public communications between the firm and its investors, and between the firm and its regulators.
There are two major types of securities litigation: the SEC’s enforcement actions and the
private class action litigation. According to Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) estab-
lished by the Stanford Law School, a securities class action is a case brought pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of a group of persons who purchased the securities of a
particular company during a specified period of time (the class period). The complaint generally
contains allegations that the company and/or certain of its officers and directors violated one or
more of the federal or state securities laws. A suit is filed as a class action because the members
of the class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
2.2 Common Types of Alleged Securities Fraud
Table 1 lists the types of commonly alleged securities fraud in class action lawsuits between
1996 and 2002 and the frequency distribution. The litigation information is retrieved from SCAC.
I identify the specific nature of fraud allegations based on information extracted from the case
complaints and/or press releases. In each year there was a small number of cases that did not
provide enough information for us to determine the nature of the allegations. Therefore, the
information provided in this section is based on the identifiable filings.
1. Financial statement fraud, which refers to the deliberate and material misstatement of fi-
nancial statements issued by publicly traded companies to mislead the financial statements
users (Rezaee [2002]).
2. Misrepresentation or concealment of material facts (excluding misreporting in the financial
statements). Material facts are the ones that, if made available, would cause the information
receivers to change their judgment or decision. This category of securities fraud includes
a public firm issuing false information and/or omit important information in security reg-
istration statements/prospectus (section 11, 12(a) of the Securities Act of 1933), in proxy
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statements (section 14 of the Exchange Act of 1934) and other important public documents,
as well as false and misleading oral communications at press releases and conference calls.
Many allegations in this category also frequently involves affirmative fraud, i.e., the release
of false forward-looking statements to the investing public. An example of affirmative fraud
is that a public firm issue glowing but misleading projections about the firm’s future business
prospects and competitive position.
3. Illegal insider trading. According to the SEC’s definition, illegal insider trading refers gener-
ally to buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust
and confidence, while in possession of material, non-public information about the security.
Insider trading violations may also include “tipping” such information, securities trading by
the person “tipped”, and securities trading by those who misappropriate such information.
“Insiders” generally include officers, directors, and individuals who hold more than 10 percent
of the company’s stock (regardless of whether they work for the company).
4. Investment bank fraud. This category of fraud refers to the unfair dealings in investment
banking activities. Most commonly alleged investment bank frauds include unfair IPO allo-
cations and misleading analyst reports.
5. Breach of fiduciary duty. This category generally involves violations of section 14 of the
Exchange Act. Section 14 prohibits any information misrepresentation in the proxy state-
ments, particularly information related to tender offers, management buyouts, and other
merger/acquisition activities. Most of the cases in this category alleged that the manage-
ment or controlling shareholders expropriated minority shareholders in merger/acquisition
activities, and misled minority shareholders to tender or exchange their shares at unfairly
low prices.
6. Stock price manipulation, which refers to deliberate buying or selling of a security, or de-
liberate intervention of other people’s buying or selling of a security, in order to control the
price of the security.
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Table 2.1: Commonly Alleged Securities Fraud
This table presents the types of commonly alleged securities fraud in 1268 private securities class
action lawsuits between 1996 and 2002. Pure investment bank fraud cases (i.e., cases that allege
unfair IPO allocations by securities underwriters and untrue securities analyst reports) are ex-
cluded. “Other information misrepresentation/omission” means material non-accounting related
information misreporting or omission.
Nature of Fraud # of Filings % of Total
Number of observations 1268
Accounting irregularity 596 47.08
Other information misrepresentation/omission 486 38.33
Illegal insider trading 337 26.58
Breach of fiduciary duty 49 3.90




This thesis is related to several strands of research: (1) the accounting literature on earnings
management and financial disclosure; (2) the literature on agency theory; and (3) recent research
on corporate fraud.
The economics of corporate misreporting is examined in the accounting disclosure literature.
Dye (1988) analyzes two conditions under which earnings management may exist in equilibrium.
First, the cost-minimizing contract that induces preferred action from the manager may not prevent
earnings management, which leads to the internal demand for earnings management. Second,
incumbent shareholders may attempt to alter the perceptions of prospective investors through
managed earnings, which creates the external demand for earnings management.
In line with Dye’s notion of internal demand for earnings management, Lacker and Weinberg
(1989) show that the optimal risk sharing contract may not prevent the agent from falsifying the
outcome. Goldman and Slezak (2003) show that the optimal equity compensation contract that
induces the desired managerial effort may not prevent (and may even encourage) the agent from
misreporting.
Several other papers together with my paper are consistent with Dye’s notion of external
demand for earnings management. Stein (1989) argues that capital market pressure can induce the
management to inflate current profitability at the expense of forgoing future cash flows. Bebchuk
and Bar-Gill (2002) present a model in which firms’ needs for external financing and insiders’ benefit
from informed trading can motivate management to misreport corporate performance. Jensen
(2004) argues that corporate fraud can result from a dramatic form of capital market pressure.
When the market substantially overvalues a firm’s equity, the firm may feel forced to defraud
investors in order to defend such overvaluation, and this can lead to serious value destructions in
the firm. I show that overvaluation can result from the firm’s endogenous choice, and an important
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source of value destruction is the fraud-induced investment distortions.
There has been a large body of empirical research on earnings management. Earnings
management does not necessarily imply the existence of securities fraud. Earnings management
reflects discretionary managerial judgment (or managerial flexibility) in corporate financial re-
porting.1 However, both securities fraud and earnings management involve some information
misrepresentation. A number of studies have examined different incentives for earnings manage-
ment, including capital market needs, contracts written on accounting numbers and government
regulations (see Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a review of empirical work on earnings management).
The literature provides evidence that managers have incentives to manipulate earnings in an at-
tempt to influence short-term stock price performance before major external financing activities or
externally-financed investment (see, e.g., Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a,b) on public equity offers;
Erickson and Wang (1998) on stock-financed acquisitions). Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2004)
find that the likelihood of an earnings restatement is significantly higher for firms that make one
or more sizable acquisitions. Several studies have examined the relation between the structure of
managerial compensation contracts and the likelihood of earnings management, and find that the
pay-performance sensitivity induced by stock options seems to increase earnings management (see,
e.g., Gao and Shrieves (2003)).
Research directly on corporate fraud has been sparse, but has started to attract academic
interest after the explosion of corporate scandals and the recent legislation movement. Most of
the recent studies focus on the effects of insider equity incentives on firms’ incentives to misreport.
Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2003), Peng and Röell (2004), Burns and Kedia (2004), and Efendi,
Srivastava and Swanson (2004) all find that large executive pay-for-performance sensitivity is posi-
tively associated with fraudulent reporting. These results seem to support the over-incentivization
argument that insider equity incentive is a double-edged sword. It may induce managerial mis-
reporting incentive rather than managerial effort in creating shareholder wealth. Alexander and
Cohen (1999), however, documents a negative relation between insider ownership and the likelihood
1Schipper [1989] defines earnings management as “purposeful intervention in the external reporting process, with
the intent of obtaining some private gain to managers or shareholders”.
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of fraud and provide some support for the classic agency theory.
Several studies have examined the relation between the characteristics of the board and the
probability of corporate fraudulent reporting. Beasley (1996) studies a sample of firms subject to
SEC’s AAERs and finds that board independence (proxied by the percentage of outside directors
in the board) is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Klein
(2002) finds an inverse relation between board independence and abnormal accruals. Dechow, Sloan
and Sweeney (1996) find that firms committing financial statement fraud are likely to have a board
dominated by insiders and have a CEO who is also the chairman of the board or the founder of the
company. Agrawal and Chadha (2004) examine the incidence of accounting restatements, and find
that board independence is irrelevant, but the presence of independent directors with financial or
accounting expertise on the audit committee is associated with significantly lower probability of
accounting restatements.
The major contributions of my thesis to the literature are threefold. First, my thesis is the
first paper that seriously analyzes the role of real investment in the context of corporate fraud. My
theory model shows that investment influences both a firm’s ex-post probability of fraud detection
and its ex-ante propensity to commit fraud. Fraud can induce distorted investment incentives,
which is the real economic cost of fraud. Second, I empirically examine the model predictions on the
relation between fraud and corporate investment incentives, and find strong support for my theory.
For example, I find that risky investment and uncorrelated investment have a strong negative effect
on the probability of fraud detection, while straightforward investment and correlated investment
do not. This implies that the type of investment matters in determining the firm’s detection
risk. I also find that acquisition expenditures influence the probability of fraud only if it is (at
least partially) financed by stock, indicating that the financing of investment matters. The third
contribution of my thesis is methodological. I introduce a new empirical methodology to analyze
fraud. The existing literature has ignored the fact that we only observe detected fraud. That is,
the outcome we observe depends on the outcome of two latent processes: fraud commitment and
fraud detection. If we ignore this structure, we could draw incorrect inferences, because the same
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variable can have opposing effects on the two latent processes and thus get masked in its overall
effect on the outcome we observe. This study utilizes statistical methods to disentangling fraud
commitment and fraud detection. This allows me to control for the unobservability of undetected
frauds. More important, this allows me to examine the economics of each component as well as
their interactions. My thesis provides new insights about corporate fraud incentives that cannot
be obtained using the models in the existing literature.
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Chapter 4
A Model of Securities Fraud
This chapter develops an economic framework of securities fraud. I analyzes the interaction
between the firm’s financial disclosure and its real investment decision. I also characterize the
firm’s equilibrium disclosure strategy, probability of committing fraud and the magnitude of fraud.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the model framework and assumptions.
Section 4.2 characterizes the firm’s cost-benefit tradeoff of committing fraud. Section 4.3 examines
the firm’s investment incentives in the presence of fraud. Section 4.4 derives the firm’s equilibrium
disclosure strategy. Section 4.5 discusses model implications and possible extensions.
4.1 Model Framework
4.1.1 The Firm
Consider a typical public firm whose market value consists of both its assets in place and
growth opportunities. The asset value is normally distributed, Ã ∼ N(A, σ2A).1 The growth
opportunity takes the form of a possible new investment project in the future whose value is also
normally distributed, G̃ ∼ N(G, σ2G). The market knows the distributions of Ã and G̃, but does
not observe the realizations of each component. The market value of the firm is the expected
discounted value of future cash flows. For simplicity, I assume that investors are risk neutral, and
the discount rate is zero. Therefore, the firm value is simply E(V ) = A + G.
The firm is operated by a manager who owns a fraction 0 < α < 1 of the firm. I assume that
the manager holds restricted stock and thus is not allowed to trade any of his own equity shares.
This simplifying assumption allows abstraction from the incentive and signalling effects of insider
trading, and it also implies that the manager maximizes the wealth of long-term shareholders.2
1I can always choose reasonable values for Ã and σA such that negative asset values have almost zero probabilities.
2I assume that there is no opportunity for perquisite consumption. This type of agency problem is not the focus
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The accounting and auditing literature has provided evidence that both capital market
activities (see the citations in the introduction) and profits from informed trading (e.g., Summers
and Sweeney (1998)) can motivate fraudulent reporting. According to my study of private securities
class action litigation against US public companies between 1996 and 2002, about 68% of the
securities lawsuits involved misreporting surrounding major capital market activities (external
financing or externally-financed investment), and about 29% of the cases involved allegations of
illegal insider trading and insider personal gains. This paper focuses on fraud and firm investment,
and thus analyzes the former scenario. The model shows that even when the manager’s interest
is perfectly aligned with that of existing shareholders, fraud can still exist in equilibrium. Adding
managerial agency problem could, of course, further exacerbate the manager’s fraud incentives.
4.1.2 Time Line and Assumptions
There are four periods in this model, t = 0, 1, 2, 3. The sequence of events is described below
(also see Figure 1 at the end of the chapter for an outline).
Time 0: Institutional Arrangements At time 0, the institutional arrangement of the firm
is established. The strength of the firm’s internal corporate governance is indicated by p ∈ [0, 1].
Higher p represents better governance and also higher likelihood of internal detection of fraud.3
Time 1: Disclosure of Earnings At time 1, the manager privately observes the realization
of the intermediate earnings generated by the firm’s assets.4 The earnings realization is drawn
from the following process.
ẽ = qÃ + ũ. (4.1)
q indicates the average productivity of the firm’s assets in place, of which the market is aware. ũ
is a white noise term, ũ ∼ N(0, σ2u). Equation (4.1) shows that the realized intermediate earnings
(e) contain useful information about the value of the firm’s assets. Let the signal-to-noise ratio be
of this paper.
3Section 4.5 will discuss the possibility of endogenizing this parameter.
4The intermediate information does not have to be earnings. It can be any valuable piece of accounting in-







. Then the expected value of the assets conditional on the earnings realization e is
E(Ã|e) = A + δ(e− e).
After observing the intermediate earnings, the manager makes a disclosure decision,
y(e) = e + η. (4.2)
η represents the amount of distortion in the reported earnings. η = 0 means that the manager
chooses to truthfully reveal the earnings realization. η > 0 implies that the manager inflates
earnings. η is assumed to be nonnegative. That is, this paper focuses on overreporting of earnings.
It is possible that managers may intentionally understate earnings (e.g., the case of Freddie Mac).
Empirical studies on earnings management as well as SEC accounting and auditing enforcement
actions, however, indicate that accounting overstatement is much more frequently observed than
understatement (see, e.g., Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991); Rezaee (2002)), and thus it is a more
interesting subject for research.
Once the earnings disclosure is made, the market prices the firm’s equity based on the
reported earnings y(e), but the market does not have to take the earnings announcement at face
value. Investors are generally aware of the possibility of misreporting. The market’s prior belief
about the firm’s likelihood of misreporting is π0 ∈ [0, 1], and the expected amount of misreporting
is η. Then the time 1 market value of the firm’s assets is V1 = Eπ0 [Ã|y(e)], where the expectation
incorporates the market’s prior belief about fraud.
Time 2: Investment Decision In this period, a new investment opportunity arrives with
probability λ, requires an initial outlay of $I, and will generate a gross return R̃, R̃ ∼ N(R, σ2R).
For simplicity, I set R = 1, which allows me to parameterize the profitability of the new investment
in a straightforward way. Once the new investment opportunity arrives, the manager observes the
gross return as r, the realization of R̃. The market does not observe this but knows the return
distribution (i.e., the mean and variance of R̃).
The manager makes an investment decision: whether to take the new project or not. If he
decides to take it, the firm needs to raise $I as the initial capital. I assume that new equity shares
are issued. I will discuss the robustness of the model results with respect to this assumption in
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section 4.2.2.
Time 3: Liquidation At time 3, the firm has a liquidating cash flow Ṽ . If the firm invests at
time 2,
Ṽ = Ã + IR̃ =
1
q
ẽ + IR̃− 1
q
ũ. (4.3)
If the firm does not invest,






The market is able to observe this final cash flow and can use this information to update
its belief about the probability of fraud at time 1. How the market interprets a particular final
cash flow realization depends on the market’s expectation about Ṽ . The following table lists
four distributions of Ṽ : the perceived distribution (conditional on y(e)), the true distribution
(conditional on e), the distribution given that the firm invests (I), and the one given not (N).
Investment (I) No Investment (N)
True E(Ṽ |I, e) = E(Ã + IR̃|I, e) E(Ṽ |N, e) = E(Ã|e)
V ar(Ṽ |I, e) = V ar(Ṽ |I) V ar(Ṽ |N, e) = V ar(Ṽ |N)
Perceived E(Ṽ |I, y) = E(Ã + IR̃|I, y) E(Ṽ |N, y) = E(Ã|y)
V ar(Ṽ |I, y) = V ar(Ṽ |I) V ar(Ṽ |N, y) = V ar(Ṽ |N)
V ar(Ṽ |I) = σ2e/q2 + (IσR)2 + 2ρIσRσe/q + σ2u/q2, where ρ is the correlation between ẽ and R̃.
V ar(Ṽ |N) = σ2e/q2 + σ2u/q2. We can see that misreporting only distorts the expected value of the
firm’s final cash flow, not the variance of it.
4.2 Cost and Benefit of Fraud
This section characterizes the cost-benefit tradeoff of committing fraud. The litigation cost
of fraud is derived in section 4.2.1. The benefit from fraud and the manager’s optimization problem
are presented in section 4.2.2.
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4.2.1 Litigation Cost of Fraud
At time 3, after the realization of the final cash flow, the market may unearth the manager’s
misreporting at time 1 with some probability. If fraud is detected, the firm will be subject to a
fraud penalty. The expected litigation cost, which is the product of the detection likelihood and
the penalty after detection, is the cost of committing fraud.
Probability of Fraud Detection
This model considers two fraud detection mechanisms: detection through cash flow and
detection through internal corporate governance.5 At time 3, after observing the firm’s final cash
flow, the uninformed outsiders rationally choose an investigation strategy that maximizes their
payoff from litigation.6 More specifically, the market chooses a threshold v such that it will
investigate the manager’s time 1 disclosure whenever the final cash flow realization V falls below
this threshold. I assume that any misreporting, if it exists, will be discovered upon investigation
(i.e., the conditional probability of fraud detection upon investigation is 1). Thus, I will use the
probability of fraud investigation and the probability of fraud detection interchangeably. I call the
region {V : V ≤ v} the cash flow detection region. If this region is not reached (i.e., V > v), no
external investigation will be triggered, but detection of fraud is still possible. In this situation,
the probability of fraud detection solely depends on the firm’s quality of corporate governance
(p). That is, p indicates the likelihood of an internal investigation of fraud when the cash flow
realization does not automatically reveal fraud. In sum, the likelihood of detection conditional on
V ≤ v is 1, and the likelihood conditional on V > v is p. Then the effective probability of fraud
detection is
P = Prob.(V > v)× p + Prob.(V ≤ v)× 1. (4.5)
Probability of Cash Flow Detection At time 3, if the market investigates the firm, the
5Of course, there are other detection forces, such as regulators (SEC) and independent auditors. This paper
focuses on the role of capital markets and internal corporate governance in discovering fraud.
6Here the outsiders can be the firm’s outside (and uninformed) investors or the regulators such as the SEC.
Therefore, the role of outsiders represents general capital market monitoring.
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expected payoff from the effort is fE(η|V )− C, where C > 0 is the investigation cost. Therefore,
the market will examine the firm’s disclosure practice if and only if fE(η|V )− C ≥ 0, or





V ar(V ) . Then under the perceived cash flow distribution (the one based on y(e)), we
have
E(e|V ) = e + δV [V − E(V |y)]. (4.7)
When we substitute this expression into equation (4.6), we can see that an external investigation
will be triggered if and only if
V ≤ v = E(V |y)− e + C/f − y
δV
. (4.8)
This condition implies that when the final cash flow realization is sufficiently below the market
expectation, outside investors will rationally think they have been misled and will start an inves-
tigation. Define
vc =
v − E(V |y)√
V ar(V )
,
and let Φ denote the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Then the firm’s probability
of facing an outside investigation under the perceived distribution is7
Prob.[V ≤ v|y] = Φ(vc). (4.9)
Yet, the firm’s true probability of having an external investigation is not simply Φ(vc).
Let ν = 1√
V ar(V )
be the precision of the firm’s final cash flow. Then, under the true cash flow
distribution (the one based on e), we have
Prob.[V ≤ v|e] = Φ(vc + K), (4.10)
where K = [E(V |y)−E(V |e)]ν. We can see that when K is positive, the firm’s actual probability
of cash flow detection is strictly greater than Φ(vc). In other words, the more the manager can
7Since Φ(vc) is not necessarily zero, even an honest firm may face an outside investigation. However, if the firm
has not misreported, the investigation will not lead to discovery of fraud. Thus the honest firm will not be punished
even if it may face an outside investigation.
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raise the market’s expectation about V by false disclosure (E(V |y) > E(V |e)), the more likely is
an outside investigation of fraud (see Figure 2 at the end of the chapter for an illustration). This
implies that the benefit and cost of fraud are endogenously related to each other, and there exists
an optimal size of fraud.
In sum, the essential point underlying the cash flow detection mechanism is that the final
cash flow realization V is a function of the true earnings realization e, not the reported earnings y(e)
(see equations (4.3) and (4.4)). Therefore, investors can update their belief about the probability
of misreporting after observing V , whose realization the fraudulent manager cannot fully control.
This implies that fraud can be partially self-revealing, which is supported by securities litigation
in the United States. Table 2 at the end of the paper lists the corporate events or entities that
precipitated the federal private securities class action lawsuits filed in 1996 and 1997 in the United
States. Among the 187 lawsuits, at least 132 cases (or 70.6% of the total) were filed after some
unexpectedly disappointing earnings realizations.
Expected Probability of Fraud Detection At time 1, when the manager makes the disclosure
decision y(e), what matters is his expected fraud detection likelihood P . Essentially, P tells the
manager how risky it is to commit fraud.
Let ΦI (ΦN ) be the probability of cash flow detection if the firm invests (does not invest).
ΦI = Φ(vc,I + KI), (4.11)
ΦN = Φ(vc,N + KN ), (4.12)
vc,I = −e + C/f − y
δV,I
νI , (4.13)
vc,N = −e + C/f − y
δV,N
νN , (4.14)
KI = [E(V |y)− E(V |e)]νI , (4.15)
KN = [E(V |y)− E(V |e)]νN , (4.16)
where νI = 1√
V ar(V |I) and νN =
1√
V ar(V |N) . Now let PI (PN ) denote the effective probability of
fraud detection, given that the firm invests (does not invest) at time 2. Then according to equation
22
(4.5). We have
PI = (1− ΦI)p + ΦI , (4.17)
PN = (1− ΦN )p + ΦN . (4.18)
These two equations imply that the probability of fraud detection within the firm depends on
firm-specific attributes, such as the quality of corporate governance and the nature of cash flows.
More important, ΦI and ΦN depend on the manager’s disclosure strategy (y(e)) and the market’s
response (E[V |y(e)]). This implies that the likelihood of detection and thus the litigation cost are
endogenous to the manager’s decision making.
At time 1, the manager’s expected probability of fraud detection (P ) is simply a weighted
average of PI and PN . Let x be the probability that the firm will undertake a newly arrived
investment project (x will be endogenously determined in section 4.3). Then λx is the probability
that the firm will exercise a growth option at time 2. Then we have
P = λxPI + (1− λx)PN . (4.19)
Fraud Penalty
Once fraud is discovered, the firm is subject to a legal fine of fη. That is, the fraud penalty
is assumed to be proportional to the amount of distortion in the earnings announcement. The fine
is paid out of the company’s final cash flow V . Monetary settlement is a prevailing means of fraud
punishment. Of course, there are other negative consequences of fraud such as the negative price
response to securities litigation (Griffin, Grundfest and Perino (2003)), loss of the firm’s reputation,
persistent increase in the cost of capital (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996)), and long-run poor
firm performance (Baucus and Baucus (1997)). I incorporate all the explicit and implicit fraud
consequences in the marginal fraud penalty parameter f and measure them in terms of money.
In order to understand the nature of securities fraud and the role of securities litigation (or
fraud detection), it is important to know who bears the litigation cost of fraud (i.e., who pays the
fine and who receives the compensation). Let us consider a typical private securities class action
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litigation. The plaintiff (or class members) is a group of the firm’s outside security holders (e.g.,
equity holders, debt holders) who purchase the firm’s public securities during some specific time
period (class period). Once the lawsuit is settled, the defendant firm (or its existing shareholders)
pays the settlement to the plaintiff investors. In this model, the class period would start at time
1 if the manager makes false disclosure and end at time 3 if the fraud is uncovered. The class
members would be the new (and uninformed) shareholders who finance the firm’s new project at
time 2.
4.2.2 Fraud Incentives
If a new investment opportunity arrives at time 2 and the firm takes it, the market value
of the firm based on its earnings disclosure and investment decision is E(V |I, y), while the true
value of the firm is E(V |I, e). The difference between E(V |I, y) and E(V |I, e) results from the
misreporting of earnings at time 1.




of new equity. β is the percentage ownership of the new shareholders. The expected value to
existing shareholders at time 3 is thus (1 − β)E(V |I, e). The value of β indicates the cost of
external financing. A high β means that the incumbent shareholders need to sacrifice a large
fraction of the final cash flows in order to raise $I, or a high cost of external capital. We can see
that β is a function of the reported earnings y(e). If E(V |I, y) increases in y(e), then β decreases in
y(e). This implies that a potential benefit of committing fraud is that financial misreporting may
create (or sustain) short-term market overvaluation of the firm’s equity and thus reduce the firm’s
cost of external financing.8 Of course, there may exist other motives for fraud, such as incentive
8I assume that the firm has to finance the new project by raising new equity. Since the benefit of fraud derives
from the effect of financial misreporting on the short-term market valuation of the firm’s outside security, the insight
of the model will not change if the firm can use debt financing. In the debt context, there is still an external financing
cost, which is the interest rate the firm pays.
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compensation and insider trading profit. This paper, however, focuses on firms’ financing and
investment incentives in the presence of fraud.
Misreporting also comes with a cost: the expected litigation liability. Both the fraud penalty
and the probability of detection are functions of η = y(e) − e. The cost-benefit tradeoff leads to
the following maximization problem for the manager at time 1.
max
η≥0
Π = λx[1− β(y)]E(V |I, e) + (1− λx)E(V |N, e)− P (η)fη, (4.20)
where P (η) = λxPI + (1− λx)PN . The expected value to long-term shareholders is their expected
final cash flow net of the litigation cost. The solution to this problem, η∗, is the optimal amount
of misreporting.
4.3 Securities Fraud and Investment Incentives
In order to solve the manager’s optimization problem in equation (4.20), I need to derive
the manager’s investment incentive x in the presence of fraud. Recall that x is the probability that
the manager will undertake a newly arrived investment project at time 2. Section 4.3.1 derives the
firm’s investment incentive at time 2, given its disclosure strategy at time 1. Section 4.3.2 presents
a numerical illustration.
4.3.1 Investment Distortions
Suppose that a new investment opportunity does arrive at time 2. The manager privately
observes the gross return to the new project as r. If the firm issues new equity and invests, the
market value of the firm’s equity will be
E(V |I, y) = E(Ã|I, y) + IE(R̃|I). (4.21)
The true value of the firm is, however, E(Ã|e) + Ir. In order to invest, the firm needs to issue a
fraction β = I/E(V |I, y) of new equity. The firm also faces the potential litigation liability PIfη,
if η 6= 0. Then the expected final payoff to the existing shareholders is (1−β)[E(Ã|e)+ Ir]−PIfη
if the firm invests, or E(Ã|e)− PNfη if the firm does not issue and invest. Therefore, for the firm
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to issue and invest, we need
(1− β)[E(Ã|e) + Ir]− PIfη > E(Ã|e)− PNfη. (4.22)
A cutoff investment profitability rc can be derived such that the above condition is satisfied when
r > rc. In other words, the firm will invest if and only if the return to the new investment exceeds
some threshold level rc. rc = 1 means that the firm will strictly follow the positive NPV rule when
making new investment. rc > 1 implies that the firm tends to underinvest in the sense that it will
pass up some positive NPV projects. rc < 1 implies that the firm tends to overinvest in the sense
that it will undertake some negative NPV projects. Therefore, the manager’s investment incentive
is reflected in his choice of the cutoff profitability to new investments. The model results about
the manager’s investment decision are presented in the following propositions. Detailed proofs are
provided in the appendix.
Proposition 1 Financial misreporting can affect the firm’s investment incentives. Specifically,
the firm’s cutoff profitability to new investments (r∗c ) depends on its magnitude of fraud (η). r
∗
c (η)
is the solution to the following equation.
rc =
E(Ã|e)
E(Ã|I, y) + IσRm(zc)
− (PN − PI)fη
(1− β)I , (4.23)
where
zc = (rc −R)/σR,
and
m(zc) = φ(zc)/[1− Φ(zc)].
Given the manager’s misreporting strategy η at time 1, the probability that the firm will undertake
a newly arrived investment opportunity at time 2 is
x = Prob.[r > r∗c (η)] = 1− Φ[z∗c (η)]. (4.24)
The lower the cutoff investment profitability, the more likely is the firm to exercise its growth
option at time 2.
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Proposition 2 Making a new investment can decrease the firm’s probability of being investigated
at time 3 if the firm can boost its market value by overstating its earnings, and either the correlation
between the cash flow from the new investment and that from the existing assets is in a neighborhood
around zero or the cash flow from the new investment is volatile enough and the correlation is in
some certain range. Specifically, PI < PN if E[V |y(e)] > E[V |e] when η > 0 and one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
(1) ρ ∈ [−ε, ε], where ε is an arbitrary small positive number;
(2) max(−1,− σeqIσR ) < ρ < ρ ≤ 1, and IσR > IσR.
Proposition 3 If the firm can boost its market value by overstating its earnings, then the firm has
an incentive to overinvest. That is, if E[V |y(e)] > E(V |e) when η > 0, then r∗c < 1. The larger




The essential message in these propositions is that financial misreporting can influence the
firm’s investment incentives in two ways. First, misreporting can influence the short-term firm
value and thus the firm’s short-term external financing cost. This effect is reflected in the first
term on the right-hand side of equation (4.23). If a low-earnings firm overstates its earnings
(y(e) > e) to pool with a high-earnings firm, and if the market cannot fully see through this, then
we have E(Ã|y) > E(Ã|e) for the low-earnings and dishonest firm. This implies that the market
on average will overvalue the equity of the fraudulent firm. This overvaluation lowers the firm’s
external financing cost and thus gives the firm a larger incentive to raise money and invest, resulting
in overinvestment. The high-earnings firm, however, will suffer from some market undervaluation
due to the cross-subsidization between the good firm and the fraudulent firm. The good firm
cannot finance the new investment on reasonable terms and therefore has less incentive to issue
and invest. This is consistent with the underinvestment argument in Myers and Majluf (1984). In
sum, the fraud-induced market mispricing implies that a fraudulent firm tends to overinvest, and
a good and honest firm tends to underinvest.
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Second, financial misreporting can also affect the firm’s investment decision through the
influence of investment on the firm’s litigation risk. The second term on the right-hand side of
equation (4.23) represents the change in the expected litigation cost per investment dollar if the
firm invests rather than not. If this change is negative, then the reduction in litigation risk will
push the fraudulent firm’s profitability threshold r∗c further down below 1. This means that the
potential negative effect of making a new investment on the firm’s litigation risk will exacerbate
the investment distortion. Given any η > 0, Proposition 2 states that PI < PN if the investment
is uncorrelated with the firm’s existing assets or if the investment is risky enough. The basic
intuition is as follows. The market observes the combined cash flow from the firm’s assets in place
and from the new investment, and draw inference about the magnitude of misreporting on the
asset value based on the total cash flow. On one hand, given the level of cash flow volatility of
the new investment, the inference problem will be most difficult for the market when the cash flow
correlation between the new investment and the existing assets is low around zero. On the other
hand, given the level of correlation, high cash flow volatility from the new investment will decrease
the valuation precision of the firm’s total cash flow and make it harder for the outsiders to see
through fraud. Therefore, the incentive to disguise fraud will induce the fraudulent manager to
overinvest in risky (high cash flow volatility) and uncorrelated projects. In the following analysis,
I will focus on the case in which PI < PN .
In sum, the key insight in Propositions 1 to 3 is that securities fraud can lead to real
value losses. The distorted investment incentive can arise both from the fraud-induced market
misvaluation of the firm’s assets (E[A|y(e)] 6= E[A|e]) and from the effect of investment on the
firm’s litigation risk (PI 6= PN ). Securities fraud can lead to underinvestment by good and honest
firms and overinvestment by fraudulent firms.
4.3.2 A Numerical Illustration
This section presents a numerical example to illustrate the relationship between fraud and
the firm’s investment incentives. Two levels of earnings realization are considered: eL and eH ,
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eL < eH . Based on the firm’s true earnings realization (e) and its reported earnings (y), I label
the firm as one of the following three types.
LH firm: low earnings (e = eL) are honestly revealed (y = eL);
HH firm: high earnings (e = eH) are honestly revealed (y = eH);
LD firm: low earnings (e = eL) are reported as high earnings (y = eH).
Table 3 presents each type of firm’s cutoff return to new investments r∗c and probability of
making a new investment x (in parentheses). The numerical example reveals the following patterns
with respect to the firm’s investment incentives in the presence of securities fraud.
(1) The HH firm tends to underinvest (r∗c > 1), and the LD firm tends to overinvest (r
∗
c < 1).
Put differently, the LD firm is more likely to exercise its growth option than the HH firm
and the LH firm. These distortions emerge in all three panels.
(2) Holding other parameters constant, an increase in the magnitude of misreporting (η) worsens
both the underinvestment problem of the HH firm and the overinvestment problem of the
LD firm (as shown in panel A). This clearly demonstrates the investment distortion spillover
between fraudulent and honest firms.
(3) Holding other parameters constant, an increase in the volatility of the investment return
(IσR) helps to mitigate the underinvestment problem of the HH firm but exacerbates the
overinvestment problem of the LD firm (as shown in panel B). This is because higher invest-
ment volatility is associated with higher value of the firm’s growth option, which to some
extent lessens the market undervaluation of the HH firm but worsens the overvaluation of
the LD firm.9 Furthermore, according to Proposition 2, large IσR also strengthens the neg-
ative effect of investment on the firm’s litigation risk, which motivates the fraudulent firm to
overinvest.
(4) Holding other parameters constant, larger asset volatility (σA) exacerbates both the underin-
vestment problem of the HH firm and the overinvestment problem of the LD firm (as shown
9The market’s expected NPV of the new project is I[E(R̃|I) − 1] = IσRm(zc). Since m(zc) > 0, a large IσR
scales up the market value of the new project.
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in panel C). The intuition is that high volatility of the asset value implies less valuation
precision of the firm’s cash flows, which can not only worsen the misvaluation of the firm’s
assets in place but also decrease the litigation risk of the fraudulent firm.
(5) Even the LH firm tends to overinvest slightly, but this distortion has nothing to do with
securities fraud. It arises solely from the effect of asymmetric information about the invest-
ment return, as shown in Myers and Majluf (1984).10 What is important is the difference
between the r∗c of the LH firm and of the LD firm, because this difference measures the effect
of misreporting on the investment incentive of a low-earnings firm.
In sum, the numerical illustrations demonstrate that financial misreporting can distort in-
vestment decisions in both fraudulent and honest firms. The degree of distortion depends on the
magnitude of fraud as well as the characteristics of the firm’s assets and growth options.
4.4 Disclosure Strategy
Section 4.3 shows that the manager’s investment incentive (r∗c or x) can be influenced by
financial misreporting (η). Now I move back to time 1 and examine the manager’s disclosure
strategy y(e), taking into consideration her investment incentives at time 2.
At time 1, the manager privately observes the earnings (e) generated from the firm’s assets
and makes an earnings announcement y(e) = e + η(e). That is, given any earnings realization
e, the manager optimally chooses the amount of misstatement η such that the expected value
to long-term shareholders at time 3 is maximized. The manager’s objective function is specified
in equation (4.20) in section 4.2.2. Now I substitute equation (4.24) into (4.20) and rewrite the
manager’s maximization problem as follows.
max
η≥0
Π = λ[1− Φ(z∗c )][1− β(y)]E(V |I, e) + {1− λ[1− Φ(z∗c )]}E(V |N, e)− P (η)fη, (4.26)
10For the LH firm, r∗c = 1 if and only if E(R̃|I) = 1, that is, the market believes new investments are on average
zero NPV projects. If the market has bullish expectations and believes new projects on average have strictly positive
NPV (E(R̃|I) > 1), then the LH firm will have an incentive to overinvest.
30
where z∗c ≡ [r∗c (η)−R]/σR. In sum, misreporting affects the manager’s objective function in three
ways. First, it can directly affect the short-term market valuation of the firm V2(I, y) and thus its
external financing cost β(y). Second, it can indirectly influence the long-term performance of the
firm V through the endogenous investment decision r∗c (η). Third, misreporting brings a potential
litigation liability P (η)fη. The optimal strategy balances the benefit of misreporting and the cost
of it.
Section 4.4.1 describes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium disclosure strategy y∗(e) = e + η∗(e).
Section 5.3.2 analyzes some important properties of the firm’s fraud propensity and the fraud
magnitude.
4.4.1 Equilibrium Misreporting
I adopt the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept to study the manager’s equilibrium mis-
reporting strategy. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium has two requirements. First, the market forms
expectations on the firm value [E(V |y)] using Bayes’s rule whenever possible. Second, given the
market’s beliefs, the manager’s disclosure strategy y(e) maximizes her objective function in (4.27).
Proposition 4 An equilibrium disclosure strategy involves partitioning the earnings space into
fraud region(s) and nonfraud region(s). Specifically, there are three cutoff earnings realizations
−∞ < el < ec < eh < +∞, and the manager’s earnings disclosure strategy is as follows.
y∗(e) = e, if e ≥ ec,
y∗(e) = e + η∗1(e) > ec, if el ≤ e < ec,
y∗(e) = e, if e < el.
Let e′ denote the earnings value the market infers from y(e). Then the market value of the
firm’s assets in place after the earnings announcement is
V1(y) = E(Ã|e′, e′ = y), if y > eh,
V1(y) = (1− π1)E(Ã|e′, e′ = y) + π1E[Ã|e′, e′ = y−11 (e)], if ec ≤ y ≤ eh,
V1(y) = E[Ã|e′, e′ = y−12 (e)], if el ≤ y < ec,
V1(y) = E(Ã|e′, e′ = y), if y < el,
31
where π1 ≡ Prob.(misreporting|ec ≤ y ≤ eh), y−11 (e) = y(e)−η1(e), and y−12 (e) = y(e)−η2(e). η1
and η2 are the market’s expected amount of misreporting when ec ≤ y ≤ eh and when el ≤ y < ec,
respectively.
Detailed proof of this proposition is provided in the appendix. Here I discuss the impli-
cations. Proposition 4 implies that the manager will honestly reveal intermediate earnings when
the true earnings realization is very good or desperately bad. The manager has an incentive to
overstate earnings when the earnings realization is mediocre or fairly disappointing. The intuition
is as follows. When the firm is in good shape (e > ec), the manager does not need to overreport
earnings at the cost of incurring future litigation liability. When the firm is in a shaky condition
(el ≤ e < ec) but faces some possible future growth opportunities, the manager will rationally want
to take the chance and dress up short-term firm appearance so that the future growth options can
be exercised on favorable terms (i.e., a lower external financing cost). When intermediate earnings
happen to be stunningly bad (e < el), however, moderate overreporting of earnings will not change
the picture much. In this case, in order to mimic a high-earnings firm, the low-earnings firm has
to engage in substantial overstatement of earnings, which implies a large potential litigation cost.
When the expected cost of fraud exceeds the benefit, the manager and the shareholders are better
off by honestly revealing the earnings.
Proposition 4 shows that outside investors will rationally discount the firm’s earnings an-
nouncement if el ≤ y ≤ eh. When ec ≤ y ≤ eh, the fraudulent firm pools with high-earnings
firms. The market value of the firm’s assets reflects a weighted average of the two types. When
el ≤ y < ec, the market fully discounts the reported earnings because the firm has an incentive to
overreport when its true earnings realization is in this region. Proposition 4 implies, however, that




Given any cutoff value ec and el, the firm’s probability of misreporting is simply
Prob.(fraud) = Prob.(el ≤ e < ec).
The combination of a high ec and a low el implies a high fraud propensity. Different firms can have
different cutoff values and thus different likelihoods of misreporting. The fraud region as well as
the magnitude of misreporting depend on the structural parameters in the model. The following
proposition presents some comparative-static results for η∗ and Prob.(fraud) with respect to some
important benefit and cost parameters. Proof is provided in the appendix.
Proposition 5 The firm’s fraud propensity and the magnitude of fraud are related to its profitabil-
ity, growth potential, and quality of corporate governance. Specifically,
(1) ∂η∗1/∂e < 0;
(2) If PI < PN , then ∂η∗1/∂λ > 0, and ∂Prob.(fraud)/∂λ > 0;
(3) ∂η∗1/∂p < 0, ∂Prob.(fraud)/∂p < 0;
The first result states that in the fraud region, the magnitude of misreporting increases as




The second result shows that if exercising a growth opportunity can decrease the probability
of fraud detection, then both the firm’s fraud propensity and the amount of misreporting increase
in its growth potential (λ). In this model, growth can affect both the benefit and cost of engaging
in fraud. First, for a rapidly growing but cash-poor firm, misreporting business prospects and
conditions can create a short-term benefit by enabling the firm to raise external capital on favorable
terms to support its growth. Second, growth can decrease the firm’s litigation risk, if it can decrease
the valuation precision of the firm’s cash flows, ∂P∂λ = −x(PN − PI) < 0.
The last result relates the firm’s fraud propensity to the quality of corporate governance.
Good corporate governance implies more effective monitoring of management and thus a better
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chance that any fraudulent activities within the firm will be discovered, ∂P∂p > 0.
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4.5 Model Implications and Discussion
The cost-benefit analysis of securities fraud provides testable implications for (1) the relation
between fraud and investment incentives and (2) the economic determinants of the cross-sectional
differences in firms’ fraud propensities.
Fraud and Inefficient Investment This theory predicts that fraudulent firms tend to over-
invest. Yet, the investment can be inefficient and can lead to serious value destructions. The
telecommunications industry is a good illustration. Sidak (2003) offers evidence that the prevailing
financial misrepresentations in this industry during the past 7 years (particularly by WorldCom)
have led to excessive investment and overbuilding. The Eastern Management Group estimates
that a significant percentage of the $90 billion invested in that industry was misallocated because
of fraudulent growth projections.12 Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) document that in
the recent merger wave (1998-2001), acquiring firms lost a total of $240 billion surrounding the
announcement of acquisitions, and the acquisitions resulted in a net synergy loss of $134 billion
(compared to a net synergy gain of $11.5 billion in the 1980s). This implies that the market
did not see those investments as value-increasing. Interestingly, Wang (2004b) shows that this
period appeared to be fraud-prevailing. Jensen (2004) also provides some good examples of bad
investments and value destruction in fraudulent firms such as Nortel Networks and eToy.
The theory argues that part of the overinvestment incentives arise from the negative effect
of investment on the firm’s detection risk. The model predicts that the type of investment that
produces the most valuation imprecision will have the strongest effect on detection likelihood.
The theory also implies there is investment distortion spillover between fraudulent and
honest firms. Overinvestment by fraudulent firms can crowd out investment by good and honest
11This study mainly focuses on the monitoring role of corporate governance, and does not incorporate the broader
functions of governance such as designing executive compensation structures.
12Eastern Management Group, supra note 42, at 2 (quoting Joelle Tessler, “WorldCom Spine UUNET is Critical
Part of Internet,” San Jose Mercury News, September 1, 2002).
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firms. This implies that fraud-induced real value losses are borne not only by shareholders of
fraudulent firms but also by those of firms that have no intention to misreport.
Fraud Propensity and Firm Attributes The theory shows that firm characteristics can
influence the firm’s likelihood of engaging in fraud. Specifically, fraudulent firms tend to be those
who have good growth prospects and large external financing needs, but experience negative prof-
itability shocks. Growth itself is not a bad thing, but this model shows that it can have a significant
effect on the manager’s fraud incentives (both on the benefit and cost of fraud). The model pre-
dictions are consistent with many findings in the accounting literature on earnings management
and corporate fraud. Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989) study a small sample of man-
agerial frauds and conclude that the most significant “red flags” for fraud are rapid company
growth and poor accounting performance. The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Re-
porting (1987) states that young public companies have a proportionately greater risk of financial
statement fraud. Young firms generally have higher growth potential than mature firms.
Litigation Across Industries The model predicts an industry effect in the cross-sectional
distribution of securities fraud. That is, there will be “litigation clustering” in certain industries
during a specific time period. This is because both firms’ benefit from fraud (such as asset prof-
itability and growth potential) and litigation risk are correlated within an industry, which implies
that firms’ fraud propensities will be influenced by industry factors.
Effect of Increasing Disclosure The model shows that increasing the informativeness of
the earnings has an ambiguous effect on the firm’s likelihood of committing fraud. This implies
that imposing heavy disclosure requirements on public firms may not produce the expected effects.
The reason is that increased disclosure could give the market an illusion of increased transparency,
which could actually decrease market vigilance.
Fraud Detection Likelihood This theory shows that while the fraud penalty (f) is largely
determined by securities laws and regulations, fraud detection likelihood (P ) is substantially in-
fluenced by the firm’s endogenous actions as well as firm-specific attributes. This implies that
the probability of detection is more important than the penalty in determining cross-sectional
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differences in firms’ fraud propensities. The policy implication is that raising litigation liability
standards alone will achieve only limited deterrence, because firms may adjust P to offset some
effect of increased f on their expected litigation cost. More important, the theory shows that
firms may even destroy value in order to decrease their detection risk, which can be an unintended
consequence of imposing heavy penalty. Inefficient investment is one example. Leuz, Triantis and
Wang (2004) provide possibly another. They document that since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act there has been a dramatic surge in the number of public firms that voluntarily deregistered
their common stock and ceased to file regular reports with the SEC (they call this “going dark”
transactions). They also document substantial negative abnormal returns and loss of liquidity
associated with deregistration and continued drop in the firms’ market capitalization after dereg-
istration. Their findings imply that insiders of those companies may have sacrificed shareholders’
interest in order to hide from market scrutiny.
Internal Corporate Governance and Extensions This paper shows that even when the
manager’s interest is perfectly aligned with that of shareholders, fraudulent behavior can still
emerge, because incumbent shareholders may find it advantageous to defraud prospective investors.
Good corporate governance will not completely prevent fraud if it is under the control of existing
shareholders. In fact, Table 2 shows that the likelihood of fraud detection is much lower from within
the firm than from outside. Therefore, enhancing other detection forces such as capital market
vigilance, responsibility of “gatekeepers” (e.g., auditors and lawyers) and securities regulation is
necessary in combating corporate fraud.
In the present model, the quality of internal corporate governance p is exogenously deter-
mined, and I focus on detection by capital markets. A more general model can allow shareholders
of the company to choose the level of p, and allow the market to incorporate this information into
its belief about the likelihood of fraud (π0 = g(p), g′(p) < 0). Therefore, a higher p corresponds
to a higher ex ante benefit from fraud because it leads to a lower π0 and thus a smaller discount
of the firm’s earnings report (the signalling effect). As illustrated by Figure 2, however, a larger
difference between E(V |y) and E(V |e) also implies a higher likelihood of cash flow detection. This
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means that a higher p will increase the likelihood of both internal and external fraud detection
(the litigation effect). The optimal quality of internal corporate governance p∗ balances the sig-
nalling effect with the litigation effect. Since in this paper the manager represents the interests
of incumbent long-term shareholders, the extension is equivalent to having a model in which the
manager chooses η and p at the same time (i.e., time 0 and time 1 are combined). The manager’s
optimization problem can be as follows.
max
η≥0,0≤p≤1
Π = E(V |N, e) + λ[1− Φ(z∗c )][β0 − β(y, p)]E(V |I, e)− P (η, p)fη − h(p), (4.27)
where h(p) is the cost of building the quality of internal corporate governance. p∗ depends on
the functional form of g(p) and h(p). For example, if the market is not sensitive to corporate
governance (at least for some range of p realizations), then the firm will choose a p as low as
possible, regardless of its fraud propensity. If the market values good corporate governance but it
is very costly to build up the quality, then the firm may still lean towards a low p. If the market
values good governance and the cost of establishing good governance is reasonable, then the choice
of p will depend on the firm’s ex ante fraud incentives.
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Table 4.1: Fraud Discovery (1996-1997)
This table lists the various corporate events or entities that precipitated the 187 federal securities
class action lawsuits during 1996 and 1997. The litigation information is retrieved from Stanford
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. Information about the triggering events of each lawsuit is
extracted from the relevant case documents (i.e., the case complaints, the press releases, and the
court decisions). The first column of the table lists the event or entity that precipitated or initiated
the securities lawsuits. The triggering events can overlap in some lawsuits.
Precipitator 1996 1997 Total % of Total
Number of observation 93 94 187
Devastating news announcement 63 69 132 70.59
Regulators (mostly SEC) 6 6 12 6.42
Independent auditors 10 7 17 9.09
Business journal articles 7 5 12 6.42
Board/internal investigation 7 4 11 5.88
Securities analysts 1 3 4 2.14
Shareholder/Investor 3 4 7 3.74
Stock Exchanges/credit rating services 0 1 1 0.53
Management turnover 2 1 3 1.60
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Table 4.2: A Numerical Illustration of Investment Incentives
I assume the following parameter values. The value of the firm’s assets in place is normally
distributed with expectation A = 100 and volatility σA = 30. The average return on assets is
q = 0.16. The earnings noise u is normally distributed with zero mean and volatility σu = 4.
The expected earnings is e = qA = 16, and volatility is σe =
√
q2σ2A + σ2u = 6.25. The size of
the new investment is I = 25. The volatility of investment return is IσR = 25 ∗ 0.3 = 7.5. The
correlation coefficient between R̃ and ẽ is ρ = 0.3. The market’s prior belief about the probability
of misreporting is π0 = 0.5. The marginal fraud penalty is f = 1.5. The institutional efficiency is
p = 0.3. The cost of investigation is C = E(fη) = fη. In panel A, I set eL = e − σe = 9.75. I
consider two levels of eH . First, eH = e = 16, which means that η = 6.25. Second, eH = e + σe =
22.25, which means that η = 12.5. In panels B-C, η = 12.5.
Panel A: Fraud Magnitude and Investment Bias
η = 6.25 η = 12.5
LD 0.83 (71%) 0.73 (81%)
LH 0.94 (58%) 0.94 (58 %)
HH 1.05 (43%) 1.14 (33%)
Panel B: Investment Volatility and Investment Bias
IσR 2.5 7.5 12.5 17.5
LD 0.76 (79%) 0.73 (81%) 0.71 (83%) 0.69 (85%)
LH 0.98 (53%) 0.94 (58%) 0.91 (62%) 0.89 (65%)
HH 1.19 (26%) 1.14 (33%) 1.09 (38%) 1.06 (42%)
Panel C: Asset Volatility and Investment Bias
σA = 30 σA = 40
HH 1.14 (31%) 1.17 (28%)
LD 0.74 (81%) 0.69 (85%)
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Figure 2:  Probability of Fraud Detection  
 








An Empirical Investigation of Securities Fraud
This chapter empirically investigates the economic determinants of firms’ fraud propensity
and the fraud detection likelihood. More specifically, I address the following research questions:
1. How does investment influence the firm’s fraud incentives and their detection risk?
2. What are the roles of different corporate monitors in the context of fraud? What type of
corporate monitor has been effective in discovering corporate fraudulent activities?
3. What is the role of insider equity incentives in determining the firm’s propensity to commit
fraud?
4. How are firm characteristics related to the firm’s likelihood of engaging fraud and the firms’
likelihood of getting caught?
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 describes the accounting fraud sample
and presents some stylized facts about accounting-related class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2003.
Section 5.2 presents the empirical model of fraud. Section 5.3 discusses the related literature and
develops the empirical hypotheses. Section 5.4 reports the results from univariate comparisons
between the fraud sample and the comparison sample. Section 5.5 reports the multivariate analysis
on the determinants of firms’ propensity to commit fraud and the likelihood of fraud detection.
Section 5.6 presents robust checks on the model results regarding the possibility of false detection,
the timing of fraud, and different model specifications.
5.1 Fraud Sample
The fraud sample in this study is based on Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC)
established by Stanford Law School. This clearinghouse provides a comprehensive database of
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federal private securities class action lawsuits filed since 1996 in the United States. A private
securities class action is a case brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf
of a group of persons (class members) who purchased the securities of a particular company during
a specified time (class period). A suit is filed as a class action because the members of the class
are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
I went through the details of all the available case documents associated with each lawsuit
(e.g., case complaints, press releases, court decisions, etc.) to identify the nature of fraud allega-
tions. As a result, I singled out 684 lawsuits filed against 660 US public companies during 1996
to 2003 involving allegations of accounting irregularities. For firms that had multiple securities
lawsuits, I only use the earliest one in the analysis.
Existing studies mostly rely on the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAERs) to identify accounting frauds. Several recent studies use accounting restatements to
proxy for fraudulent financial reporting (Agrawal and Chadha (2004), Burn and Kedia (2004),
Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2004)). This paper is the first to study class action litigation
involving accounting-related allegations. Private class action litigation has long been an important
concomitant to the enforcement of securities laws (Cox and Thomas (2003)). The volume of class
action lawsuits is also comparable to that of the SEC’s enforcement actions. More important, class
action litigation can provide new insights for understanding market forces in securities litigation,
because class action suits generally involve the interests of thousands of investors, and key plaintiff
investors play an important role in the litigation.
My class action sample does overlap with the SEC’s AAER sample and the accounting
restatement sample that have been used in the existing studies. Among the 660 fraudulent firms
in my sample, 207 firms were subject to parallel SEC’s AAERs, and 334 firms had accounting
restatements according to the General Accounting Office’s October 2003 report.1 In Section 5.6,
I will use these two subsamples to check the robustness of my results across different proxies of
1The General Accounting Office’s October 2003 report lists all the accounting restatements between January
1997 and June 2003. My sample period is from January 1996 to December 2003. Therefore, there can potentially
be more than 334 restatements in my sample.
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securities fraud.
The following sections provides detailed descriptive information about the fraud sample.
5.1.1 Time Trends and Firm Characteristics
Table 1 describes the evolution of class action litigation over time. Panel A shows that
accounting-related frauds have on average accounted for about 47% of the total litigation activities
(excluding litigation against investment banks) over the past 8 years. The number of accounting
frauds peaked in 2002, where it represented 56.13% of all the securities class action filings. Inter-
estingly, accounting-related litigation substantially decreased in 2003 (only 40% of all lawsuits),
which may have resulted from tightened securities regulation and increased market vigilance.
Panel B shows the distribution of the class periods associated with the 660 lawsuits. Every
class action lawsuit specifies a class period. The beginning of a class period shows the earliest time
a fraud affects the market, based on the judgment of securities attorneys. A class period generally
ends at the time of some major events that precipitate the litigation. The length of the class period
provides some information about the duration of fraud. The average length of the class period is
a little more than one year, but there is substantial variation. Some frauds affected the market for
more than five years, while some less than a quarter.
Panel B also shows that firms in the fraud sample were largely young public companies.
The median age was only 3.45 years, and more than 60% of the sample firms were less than 5 years
old. About 64% of the alleged fraudulent firms were listed on NASDAQ when fraud began.
Panel C shows the distribution of the fiscal year in which fraud began. I label the beginning
fiscal year of fraud as year 0. I determine year 0 based on the beginning of the class periods and
the firms’ fiscal year end. The beginning of a class period indicates the earliest time fraud affected
the market, but does not necessarily indicate the beginning of fraud. In general, an accounting
fraud starts to affect the market when a fraudulent financial report is released to the public. Given
that there is about one month’s lag for quarterly reports and a two-to-three-month lag for annual
reports, year 0 can be the same fiscal year in which the class period starts, or the previous fiscal
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year. Figure 1 illustrates the two scenarios. If a firm was subject to both private litigation and the
SEC’s enforcement action, I cross check the beginning year with that specified by the SEC. The
information about the SEC’s enforcement actions is retrieved from the SEC’s litigation archive.
5.1.2 Industry Distribution
Table 2 presents the industry distribution of fraud. I classify the alleged fraudulent firms
into 24 industry categories. The primary classification is based on two-digit SIC codes, but in some
instances, I use three-digit SIC codes, as this is more informative about the types of companies
that engaged in fraud. Table 2 shows evidence of significant industry patterns in securities fraud
litigation. First, technology firms are disproportionately more involved in accounting-related se-
curities litigation. In particular, firms in software and programming alone accounted for 17.42%
of all accounting fraud cases in the past 8 years. Electronic parts, computer manufacturing, and
telecommunications companies represent another 19% of the litigation activities. Second, the ser-
vice sector and particularly the financial services and the business services industries also show a
high litigation concentration. In total, the technology (including bio-technology firms) and service
sectors account for 67% of all securities lawsuits studied in this paper.
5.1.3 The Nature of Fraud
Table 3 lists some specific accounting items that are often manipulated, based on the relevant
case documents in 563 class action lawsuits.2 Allegations of improper revenue recognition are most
common, accounting for 67.44% of all the accounting fraud allegations. Operational expenses are
also likely to be manipulated by managers to reach desired earnings targets (17.26% of the 563
cases). As for the balance sheet items, misstatements of assets are more frequently observed than
misstatements of liabilities and equity. Among the different types of assets, accounts receivable
and inventory seem to be frequently misstated. This observation is consistent with the findings
in Chan et al. (2005) that changes in inventory and accounts receivables are closely related to
2I am only able to clearly identify the specific accounting items in 563 out of 660 cases.
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the earnings quality and thus can help to predict future stock returns. Finally, understatement of
reserves and allowances is also fairly often, accounting for about 9% of the 563 lawsuits.
5.2 Empirical Methodology
5.2.1 A Model with Partial Observability of Fraud
In implementing comparisons between the fraud sample and any sample of non-convicted
firms, we face an identification problem because we only observe detected fraud. That is, we only
observe frauds that have been committed and subsequently detected. Firms that have not been
sued in securities litigation are either innocent firms or undetected fraudulent firms (see Figure
2 for an illustration). This implies that the probability of detected fraud (what we observe) is
different from the probability of fraud (what we are interested to estimate but cannot observe),
unless detection is perfect.
To address this identification problem, I use a bivariate probit model with partial observ-
ability as discussed in Poirier (1980) and Feinstein (1990). In essence, this technique models the
observed outcome (detected fraud) as a function of the joint realizations of two latent processes.
Let F ∗i denote firm i’s potential to commit fraud, and D
∗
i denote the firm’s potential of getting
caught conditional on fraud being committed. Then consider the following reduced form model:
F ∗i = xF,iβF + ui; (5.1)
D∗i = xD,iβD + vi, (5.2)
where xF,i contains variables that help explain firm i’s potential to commit fraud, and xD,i contains
variables that help explain the firm’s detection risk. ui and vi are zero-mean disturbance terms,
and follows a bivariate normal distribution. Their variances have been normalized to equal unity.
The correlation between ui and vi is ρ. Now I define the following binary variables.
Fraud occurrence: Fi = 1 if F ∗i > 0, and Fi = 0 if otherwise;
Fraud detection : Di = 1 if D∗i > 0, and Di = 0 if otherwise.
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We, however, do not directly observe the realizations of Fi and Di. What we observe is
Zi = FiDi
Zi = 1 if firm i has committed fraud and has been detected, and Zi = 0 if firm i has not
committed fraud or has committed fraud but has not been detected. Let Φ denote the bivariate
standard normal cumulative distribution function. The empirical model for Zi is
P (Zi = 1) = P (FiDi = 1) (5.3)
= P (Fi = 1, Di = 1)
= P (F ∗i > 0, D
∗
i > 0)
= Φ(xF,iβF , xD,iβD, ρ);
P (Zi = 0) = P (FiDi = 0) (5.4)
= P (Fi = 0, Di = 0) + P (Fi = 1, Di = 0)
= 1− Φ(xF,iβF , xD,iβD, ρ).
An implicit assumption in the model is that false detection of fraud is not allowed for
(P (Fi = 0, Di = 1) = 0), because the process of D∗i is only defined conditional on Fi = 1.
Extension of the above model to statistically control for false detection is possible, but it tends to
complicate the estimation.3 I will come back to the issue of false detection in Section 5.6.
Although I define D∗i conditional on Fi = 1, the correlation between the two disturbance
terms ρ may not necessarily be zero. As discussed in Feinstein (1990), a non-zero correlation may
arise for a number of reasons, particularly when the potential fraud-doer and the detection force
possess information about one another.
3Let D′i = 1 indicate false detection. Then
P (Zi = 1) = P (Fi = 1, Di = 1) + P (Fi = 0, D
′
i = 1);
P (Zi = 0) = P (Fi = 0, Di = 0) + P (Fi = 1, Di = 0)− P (Fi = 0, D′i = 1).
In a well-functioning legal environment, P (D′i = 1) should be very small, much smallers than P (Di = 1). Then
assuming P (D′i = 1) = 0 will not substantially bias the model estimation.
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5.2.2 Model Identification and Estimation
The partial observability of fraud raises a model identification issue. This is because we only
observe the joint outcome of two latent processes, and the decomposition between the two latent
components may not be unique. According to Poirier (1980), the conditions for full identification
of the model parameters are (1) xF,i and xD,i do not contain exactly the same variables; and (2)
the explanatory variables exhibit substantial variations in the sample.
The above model can be estimated using the maximum-likelihood method. The log-likelihood
function for the model is
L(βF , βD, ρ) =
∑
zi=1
log[P (zi = 1)] +
∑
zi=0




{ziln[Φ(xF,iβF , xD,iβD, ρ) + (1− zi)ln[1− Φ(xF,iβF , xD,iβD, ρ)]}.
I use the filing of class action lawsuits to proxy for detected fraud (i.e., Z = 1). The partial
observability model implies that the appropriate comparison sample (Z = 0) should be a random
sample of non-litigated firms. I therefore use all the firms in the COMPUSTAT database that
have not been subject to any private securities litigation (accounting-related or not) or the SEC’s
AAERs between 1996 and 2003.
5.2.3 Comparison with Straight Probit Model
A straight probit model, which has been used in many existing studies on fraud, is as follows.
For firms i=1,...,n,
P (Di = 1) = 1;
P (Zi = 1) = P (Fi = 1) = Φ(xF,iβF ).




{ziln[Φ(xF,iβF ) + (1− zi)ln[1− Φ(xF,iβF )]}. (5.6)
We can see that as long as detection is not perfect (i.e., P (Di = 1) ≤ 1), the straight probit model
will systematically understate the true probability of fraud.
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An inference problem could also arise when (5.6) is estimated instead of (5.5). For example,
we want to examine the marginal effect of an explanatory variable xi on the probability of fraud
P (Fi = 1). Let us take partial derivative of xi on both sides of equation (5.3).
∂P (Zi = 1)
∂xi
=
∂P (Fi = 1)
∂xi
P (Di = 1|Fi = 1) + ∂P (Di = 1|Fi = 1)
∂xi
P (Fi = 1). (5.7)
If this variable has opposite effects on P (Fi = 1) and P (Di = 1|Fi = 1), then ∂P (Fi=1)∂xi and
∂P (Zi=1)
∂xi
can even have different signs, not to mention that the magnitude will be different. This
may lead us to draw incorrect inference about the role of xi. Section 5.5.6 provides concrete
examples of the discussions here.
5.3 Hypothesis Development and Model Specification
Following the framework of fraud in Wang (2004), a firm’s propensity to commit fraud
depends on its expected benefit and cost from engaging in fraud. The expected cost of fraud is the
litigation risk: with some positive probability, fraudulent activities will be uncovered, resulting in
a penalty. Wang (2004) argues that while the penalty (at least the explicit liability provision) is
largely determined by securities laws and thus exogenous to the firm, the probability of detection
depends on the firm’s endogenous actions (e.g., investment, disclosure) as well as firm-specific
attributes. This implies that the detection risk is a more important determinant of the cross-
sectional variations in firms’ fraud propensities than are penalty provisions. Therefore, I focus
on the likelihood of detection for the cost side of the tradeoff. A factor will positively influence
a firm’s fraud propensity if it can increase the firm’s benefit from committing fraud, or if it can
decrease the firm’s expected probability of getting caught, or both.
The structure of this section is as follows. Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 discuss factors that
can potentially affect a firm’s detection risk and its benefit from fraud, respectively. Section ??
discusses the control variables. Section 5.3.4 summaries the model specification.
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5.3.1 Probability of Fraud Detection
The probability of fraud detection essentially determines how risky it is for a firm to engage
in fraud. If a factor can significantly influence such probability and if its effect can be anticipated
at the time the firm makes the fraud decision, then this factor will influence the firm’s ex-ante
propensity to commit fraud (in the opposite direction). Therefore, I start with the determinants
of the fraud detection likelihood (i.e., xD), and then move to the determinants of fraud propensity
(i.e., xF ) in Section 5.3.2.
Investment
Wang (2004) argues that fraudulent firms tend to overinvest. The overinvestment incentive
is twofold. First, fraud can create short-term market overvaluation of the firm and thus decrease
the external financing cost of investment. Second, after committing fraud, the fraudulent firm
has incentive to cover things up. This incentive can motivate the management to strategically
use investment to disguise fraud. Wang shows that investment with high uncertainty and/or
low correlation with current activities can mask fraud better than others, because these types of
investment can decrease the precision of the firm’s cash flows and create inference problems for
the market.
Wang’s argument has the following three testable implications: (1). Fraudulent firms have
larger investment expenditures than comparable honest firms; (2). Different types of investment
have differential effects on a firm’s probability of being detected and the probability of fraud.
Risky investments and uncorrelated investments have stronger negative effects on the detection
likelihood than other types of investments; (3). Financing of the investment influences a firm’s
probability of committing fraud. Externally-financed investment will motivate fraud better than
internally-financed investment.
To test the above implications, I investigate three types of investment: investment in re-
search & development (R&D), capital expenditures, and mergers/acquisitions. These investments
can substantially differ in their effects on a firm’s valuation precision. Investment outcome of R&D
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projects is generally highly uncertain. It is difficult for the market to fully understand and correctly
value its impact on the firm value. Capital expenditures tend to be more straightforward. COM-
PUSTAT defines capital expenditures as the funds used for additions to the company’s property,
plant and equipment. Mergers and acquisitions, in theory, should fall in the middle, because the
investment is to acquire an existing asset rather than to create something new. However, the true
value of the acquired assets and the synergy between the acquired and the existing assets may not
be correctly understood by the market or even the acquirer.
I further distinguish between cash-based acquisitions and stock-based acquisitions. The
earnings management literature has provide evidence that stock-based acquisitions are associated
with higher incentive of earnings management (e.g., Erickson and Wang (1998)). In this study, I
examine the effect of stock-based acquisitions on both the probability of fraud and the probability
of fraud detection. I also distinguish between focused acquisitions and diversifying acquisitions.
I define focused acquisitions as acquisitions within the same two-digit SIC codes. According to
Wang (2004), focused acquisitions should be associated with higher probability of detection than
diversifying ones are.
Corporate Monitoring
Effective monitoring over the management should increase the likelihood of fraud detection
and deter fraud ex ante. In this study, I examine the roles of four types of corporate monitors
in the context of corporate securities fraud: large shareholders, institutional owners, independent
auditors, and board of directors.
Monitoring by Shareholders: A firm’s ownership structure is important in determining both the
firm’s benefit from committing fraud and its detection risk. This is because the ownership structure
is crucially related to the incentive structure within the firm, including the incentive of the man-
agement to defraud outside investors and the incentive of shareholders to monitor the management
and detect fraud.
The monitoring role of large shareholders has received a great amount of attention in the
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finance and economics literature. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that concentrated ownership
is a key element of a good corporate governance system because large shareholders have high in-
centive and power to impose effective monitoring over the management. There has been quite
some empirical evidence on the role of large shareholders in corporate governance (see a recent
survey by Holderness (2003)). For example, Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) find that com-
pany performance improves after an activist investor purchases a block of shares. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) find that the presence of a large shareholder on the board is associated with
tighter control over executive compensation. In the context of corporate fraud, it is also intuitive
that large shareholders should go against fraudulent reporting, because they cannot cash out in
a short period of time to catch the windfall from fraud, and they will likely suffer a lot from the
severe consequences of fraud. Therefore, I expect a positive relation between block ownership
holding and the likelihood of fraud detection.
Large shareholders are often institutional investors. Monitoring by institutional sharehold-
ers has attracted growing public and academic interest, as institutional ownership skyrocketed
over the past two decades in the United States. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA), which was passed in December 1995, explicitly encourages more active participation
of institutional investors in securities litigation by requiring each class action lawsuit to specify a
lead plaintiff. William Lerach, a partner in Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP and a
leader in representing investors in securities class action suits, points out that some large pension
funds have actively participated in securities litigation and have successfully established corporate
governance enhancements in class action settlements.4 Therefore, I expect institutional equity
holdings to have a positive effect on fraud detection.
Monitoring by Independent Auditors: Independent auditors are probably the most important cor-
porate “gatekeepers”. They pledge their reputational capital and provide protections to dispersed
investors by verifying and assessing the quality of firms’ disclosures. In the late 1990s, however,
such protections seemingly failed. The most notorious example is Arthur Andersen’s role in the
4Keynote address by William S. Lerach in council of institutional investors spring 2001 meeting.
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Enron scandal and its subsequent criminal indictment. The increasing importance of non-audit
services in auditing firms’ total revenue has also led to widespread market concern about auditor
independence. Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) find that auditor independence is negatively
associated with the probability of earnings management. Anup and Chadha (2004) find a negative
but insignificant relation between auditor independence and the probability of accounting restate-
ments. Bajaj, Gunny and Sarin (2003) examine a sample of class action lawsuits that involve
allegations of accounting irregularities, and find no significant difference in auditors’ compensa-
tion (audit vs. non-audit fees) between the fraud sample and the comparison sample. However,
for firms with large market reaction to the alleged fraud, their auditors have significantly higher
non-audit income.
In this study, I directly examine whether higher auditor reputational capital leads to higher
likelihood of fraud detection. First, I examine whether firms whose independent auditor is one of
the five largest accounting firms (Arthur Andersen, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche,
Ernst & Young, KPMG) have a higher probability of fraud detection. Second, I examine the role
of auditor opinion in fraud detection. If the independent auditors exert due diligence in certifying
disclosures, then I expect that adverse auditor opinions to increase fraud detection.
Monitoring by Board of Directors: The monitoring role of the board of directors is an impor-
tant component of corporate governance. The board is presumed to monitor the management
on behalf of shareholders, because diffuse ownership makes direct shareholder control difficult.
The economics and finance literature on the board starts with the assumption that the board’s
monitoring effectiveness is a function of the board’s independence from the management. Two
characteristics of the board, size and composition, are related to board independence. Empirical
research in this area finds that board size and composition affect the observable board actions such
as the board’s decision on CEO turnover, executive compensation, and merger/acquisitions (see
surveys by John and Senbet (1998) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)).
The recent wave of high-profile corporate scandals has brought the effectiveness of board
monitoring to the center of securities legislation and governance reform. The newly-passed Sarbanes-
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Oxley Act (SOX) and the NYSE and NASDAQ’s new corporate governance guidance mandate a
number of changes that are aimed to improve board monitoring. For example, SOX requires that
the audit committee consist entirely of independent directors and the audit committee hire the
outside auditor. Both SEC and the national stock exchanges strongly recommend overall board
independence. Several studies have examined the relation between the characteristics of the board
and the probability of corporate fraudulent reporting. Beasley (1996) studies a sample of firms
subject to SEC’s AAERs and finds that board independence (proxied by the percentage of outside
directors in the board) is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of financial statement
fraud. Klein (2002) finds an inverse relation between board independence and abnormal accruals.
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) find that firms committing financial statement fraud are likely
to have a board dominated by insiders and have a CEO who is also the chairman of the board or the
founder of the company. Agrawal and Chadha (2004) examine the incidence of accounting restate-
ments, and find that board independence is irrelevant, but the presence of independent directors
with financial or accounting expertise on the audit committee is associated with significantly lower
probability of accounting restatements.
In this study, I examine the effect of board independence on the likelihood of fraud detection.
Following the literature, I use board size and the percentage of outside directors to proxy for board
independence. “Grey” directors who are not employees of a firm but have some business relation
with the firm are not counted as outside directors.
Unexpected Performance Shock
Wang (2004) argues that fraud can be partially self-revealing. If the manager inflates the
earnings and misleads the market to have a high expectation on the firm’s future cash flows, then
if later the cash flow realization turns out to be comparably bad (which the manager cannot fully
control), outside investors will rationally think that they probably have been fooled and will start
an investigation. Therefore, unexpected bad performance (unexpected by the market) after the
commencement of fraud will increase the probability of fraud detection.
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To proxy for such unexpected performance shock, I use the regression residual term from
the following simple prediction model.
ROAi,1 = β0 + β1ROAi,0 + β2ROAi,−1 + εi. (5.8)
ROAi,t is firm i’s return on asset in year t, which is defined as the ratio of operating income after
depreciation over the average total assets from year t−1 to year t. ROAi,1 is used as the dependent
variable because the average length of the class period is about one year. εi (the residual ROA)
will be low if firm i’s performance in year 1 is bad compared with the (reported) performance in
the previous two years. The realizations of this variable cannot be fully expected in year 0 when
the management makes the fraud decision. Therefore, although this variable may significantly
influence the firm’s detection risk, its effect is ex-post and thus should not affect the firm’s ex-ante
fraud decision.5
5.3.2 Propensity to Commit Fraud
The equilibrium supply of fraud depends on the expected benefit and cost of engaging in
fraud. Therefore, xF should include factors that can affect either the benefit from fraud, or the
litigation risk, or both. The previous section discusses some potential determinants of the detection
risk. Now I turn to factors that can potentially influence a firm’s benefit from committing fraud.
5There are two caveatees associated with this variable. First, this variable is not completely exogenous. The
direction of causality, however, is not ambiguous. It is intuitive that bad operating performance eventually reveals
fraud. Detection of fraud may result in immediate plunge in stock returns and may affect the long-run performance
of the fraudulent firm, but it is hard to believe that the revelation of fraud leads to immediate bad operating
performance. Second, the management could have better information about future abnormal bad performances
than the market does. Therefore, expectation of the residual ROA may impose some ex ante deterrence. However,
a reasonable counter argument is that the managers commit fraud because they believe that the current bad
performance is only temporary and things should go back to normal later. I will discuss the robustness of the
results regarding this variable in Section 5.6.
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Profitability and Growth Potential
Wang (2004) and Bebchuk and Bar-Gill (2002) predict that firms that have high growth
potential but experience negative profitability shocks have high propensity to commit fraud. The
intuition is that for such firms misreporting short-term firm performance can allow them to raise
external capital and exercise their growth options on sweet terms.
A problem emerges when we test the above prediction. We cannot directly observe the
negative profitability shocks because they are covered by fraud. A possible solution is to use the
ex-post restated financial data rather than the originally reported data. However, to my knowledge,
the restatement data in COMPUSTAT is not as comprehensive and complete as the original data.
Therefore, I try to infer the existence of profitability shocks by comparing the profitability before
the commencement of fraud and that at the revelation of fraud. The difference between the two
profitability levels can imply hidden performance changes when fraud is alive. I use return on asset
ROA as the profitability measure. I use two proxies for growth potential, the annual asset growth
rate and the book-to-market ratio.
External Financing Needs
The combination of low asset profitability and high growth implies large reliance of a firm
on the external capital markets. Stein (1989) argues that the lack of financial slack can expose the
manager to capital market pressure and can motivate the manager to inflate short-term perfor-
mance at the cost of forfeiting long-term values. The earnings management literature has provided
evidence that managers tend to overreport earnings prior to major external financing activities
such as public equity offerings (see, e.g., Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a,b)). I construct two vari-
ables to proxy for a firm’s external financing needs. The first variable, externally financed growth
rate, is constructed based on Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) to proxy for a firms’ projected
need for outside capital. Specifically, the externally-financed growth rate is a firm’s asset growth
rate in excess of the maximum growth rate that can be supported by the firm’s internally available
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capital (ROA/(1-ROA)).6 The second variable, EF , is constructed following Richardson and Sloan
(2003) to measure a firm’s actual net external financing cash flows. Specifically,
EFt =
∆CEt + ∆PEt + ∆DEBTt
ASSETSt
,
where ∆CEt, ∆PEt, and ∆DEBTt are the changes in the book value of common equity, preferred
equity, and total debt in year t, respectively. ASSETSt is the book value of assets.7 This variable
can be viewed as a measure of a firm’s realized external financing need. Since the second variable
is an outcome-based measure, I focus on the first variable in order to reduce endogeneity, and use
the second measure only as a robustness check.
Financial Distress
Another factor that is closely related to financial slack and external financing need is the
degree of financial distress. Maksimovic and Titman (1991) theorize that financial difficulties can
affect a firm’s incentive to honor its implicit contracts and in other ways maintain a favorable
reputation. In their model, both financial shortfalls and overall debt overhang can induce the
distressed firm to increase current cash flow at the cost of losing reputation and long-term prof-
itability. Several accounting studies find some evidence that avoidance of penalties associated with
the violations of debt covenants is a motivation to manage earnings (Sweeney (1994), DeFond
and Jiambalvo (1994), and Dechow et al. (1996)). These studies imply that financial distress can
increase firms’ incentives to misreport. I use the ratios of long-term debt and short-term debt to
total assets to proxy for the degree of financial distress.
Insider Equity Incentives
The relation between insiders’ equity incentives and the incidence of corporate fraud has
been at the center of the current debate and reform on corporate governance. There are two
forces associated with insiders’ equity stake. On one hand, the classic agency theory implies that
6See Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) for assumptions and justifications for this measure. According to
the discussion in that paper, ROA here is the ratio of income before extraordinary items over assets.
7See Richardson and Sloan (2003) for a discussion of some possible limitations of this measure.
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higher percentage insider ownership can better align insiders’ incentives to that of the shareholders.
Since fraud is outright contravention of shareholders’ interest, high insider ownership should be
associated with low fraud propensity. The agency view is supported by the work of Alexander
and Cohen (1999). They examine public firms convicted of federal crimes in 1984-1990, and find
that crime occurs less frequently among firms in which management has a larger ownership stake.
On the other hand, large equity incentives can be a double-edged sword, because the positive
relation between firm performance and insiders’ compensation (or wealth) can induce distorted
managerial reporting incentives (see, e.g., Goldman and Slezak (2003)). The second force seems
to be supported by the findings in some recent empirical work such as Johnson, Ryan and Tian
(2003), Peng and Röell (2004), and Burns and Kedia (2004). These papers find that high pay-for-
performance ratio (as a result of large equity-based compensation) is related to high probability
of fraud or earnings manipulation, indicating over-incentivization of the management.
In this study, I examine the role of insider percentage stock ownership and executive equity
compensation in the context of accounting fraud. Executive equity compensation is measured as
the value of restricted stock and stock options (using the Black-Scholes model) over an executive’s
total compensation. I then compute the sum and average of the ratios across the five top executive
officers in the firm.
5.3.3 Control Variables
Some previous studies on financial statement fraud find that firms tend to commit fraud
at a very early stage of their business cycle. Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson (1999) document
that firms that have engaged in financial statement fraud are generally small. The National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (AICPA 1987, 29) states that young public firms
may face greater pressure to dress up firm appearance and thus have higher likelihood of engaging in
fraud. There are also clear industry patterns in securities litigation (see Table 2). Technology firms
(software & programming, computer and electronic parts, biotech), service firms (financial services,
business services, utility, and telecommunication services) and the trade industries (whole sales
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and retails) appear to have disproportionately high fraud concentration. This implies that these
industries tend to have either large benefit from fraud, or high detection risk, or both. Furthermore,
firm size, age and industry segments are likely to be correlated with firms’ profitability, growth
potential, external financing need and ownership structure. Therefore, I control for firm size (log
of total assets), age (as a public company), and firms’ membership in the technology, service and
trade sectors.
5.3.4 Summary of Model Specification
Factors Variables βF βD
Growth Potential Asset Growth, Book-to-Market +
External Financing Need Ext. Fin. Growth, Ext. Fin. C.F. +
Financial Distress Leverage, ST Debt +
Profitability ROA -
Profitability (ex post) Residual ROA -
Insider Equity Incentive Insider Own, Equity Compensation +/-
Investment R&D, Capital Exp., Acquisition + -
Shareholder Monitoring Block Own, Institution Own - +
Board Monitoring Board Size, Outside Director - +
Independent Auditor Big Five, Auditor Opinion - +
Control Variables Firm Size, Age, Industry
5.4 Descriptive Information and Univariate Analysis
This section presents univariate comparisons between the fraud sample and the comparison
sample. The explanatory variables are grouped into five categories: (1) firm size and age; (2) prof-
itability and growth; (3) external financing needs; (4) investment; and (5) corporate monitoring.
Table 4 Panel A reports the median and mean of each variable for both samples and the non-
parametric Wilcoxon z-statistics for testing differences between the two samples. All the financial
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information is retrieved from COMPUSTAT database. Information on stock-based acquisition and
acquisition volume is from SDC Platinum database. Ownership information is from CDA Spec-
trum. Information on executive equity compensation is from ExecuComp database. Information
on board of directors is from EdgarPro database.
To facilitate my analysis, I use the following fiscal year counting. For the fraud sample, I
label the fiscal year in which fraud begins as year 0. The determination of year 0 is discussed in
Section 5.1.1. Then the fiscal year prior to year 0 is year -1, and the one after is year 1. Since
the comparison sample consists of all the non-litigated firms, all the comparison firms enter each
relevant fiscal year. For example, fiscal year -1 spans from 1991 to 2002 for the fraud sample. Then
all the observations of the comparison firms in year 1991 to year 2002 are labelled as information
from year -1 and are used in the analysis.
In this study, all the variables on profitability, growth, and external financing needs are
measured at the average level from year -2 to year -1. Using pre-fraud information helps to mitigate
the effect of fraud on those measures. Information on investment is from year 0. The reason is
that those investments were made around the time when fraud was committed, and therefore could
have been used strategically by the management to disguise fraud. Corporate monitoring variables
are measured at the average level from year -1 to year 0. Year 0 information is incorporated to
strengthen the deterrence effect of monitoring on firms’ decision to commit fraud.
The fraud sample on average appears to be larger but younger than the comparison sample.
Studies on SEC’s AAERs generally find that alleged firms are small (see, e.g., Beasley, Carcello and
Hermanson (1999)). Firms that are subject to private class action litigation can be larger because
class action lawsuits tend to target firms with “deeper pockets” (Cox and Thomas (2003)).
The fraud sample seems to have outperformed the comparison sample in the two years
before the commencement of fraud, and underperformed the comparison sample in year 1. This
is consistent with the argument in Section 5.3.2. Fraudulent firms experienced some negative
performance shock in year 0 but chose to cover up the problems by false financial disclosure. Then
fraud got uncovered in year 1, and the concealed bad performance was revealed.
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Table 4 Panel A also shows that fraudulent firms tend to have significantly higher growth
rate and lower book-to-market ratio than the comparison firms. The median asset growth rate
is 46% for the fraud sample, and only 9% for the comparison sample. High growth and low
internal profitability naturally leads to large need for outside capital. According to the argument
in Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), on average only 13% of the growth in the fraudulent
firms could be supported by internal funds, resulting in a high projected need for outside capital.
The fraudulent firms also raised more external capital even before the commencement of fraud.
The median ratio of net external financing cash flow to total assets is 19% for the fraud sample,
and only 4% for the comparison sample. The fraud sample, however, does not seem to be more
burdened by debt than the comparison sample.
The difference in growth opportunities across the two samples is further reflected in invest-
ment expenditures. The fraud sample on average invested more than the comparison sample did
in the year when fraud occurred. For instance, the median ratio of net investing cash outflow
to total assets is 11% for the fraud sample, and 6% for the comparison sample. However, the
univariate comparisons do not control for factors that may influence the size of investment. We
know that different industries have different investment patterns, and young firms tend to invest
more than mature firms do. Firm size is also a potential determinant of investment size. Since
all the investment variables have been normalized by the book value of assets, the size effect is
already taken into account. Therefore, in order to have a more direct test of the overinvestment
prediction in Wang (2004), I construct a control sample that is matched with the fraud sample in
terms of industry distribution (two-digit SIC codes) and firm age at the end of year -1. Table 4
Panel B shows that the fraud sample on average had a much higher investment intensity than the
control sample did both before and after the commencement of fraud. Except for capital expen-
ditures, the differences across the two samples are statistically significant, and particularly so for
merger/acquisition-related expenditures.
Finally, Table 4 Panel A shows that the fraud sample on average has more concentrated
ownership, more institutional holdings, more large insider equity incentives. The fraud sample also
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tends to have a smaller board and lower percentage of independent directors.
5.5 Multivariate Analysis
This section presents evidence from multivariate tests to simultaneously assess the effects of
firm characteristics, investment, and corporate monitoring on a firm’s propensity to commit fraud
and the probability of fraud detection.
5.5.1 Firm Characteristics and Fraud
Table 5 reports the effects of profitability, growth and external financing need on a firm’s
fraud incentives. We can see that ROA is positively associated with the likelihood of fraud. This
result may seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, it is actually intuitive because it is
difficult for a (known) troubled firm to sell a good earnings report. A firm will have incentive
to fool the market and may easily succeed when the market believes that the firm is profitable
based on previous years’ performance, while deterioration in profitability has already started. The
concealed performance deterioration, if it continues, will eventually lead to the revelation of fraud.
The average marginal effect of residual ROA on P (D|F ) across all the models is -0.26, which means
that a 10% unexpected decrease in ROA in year 1 is associated with an average 2.6% increase in the
probability of detection. This result supports the argument in Wang (2004) that fraud is, to some
extent, self-revealing. The more the manager is able to raise the market’s expectation by fraudulent
reporting, the more likely the market will later see inconsistency between firm performance and
what it has been guided to expect. The inconsistency leads to the discovery of fraud.
Table 5 also shows that a firm’s growth potential and external financing need are important
motivational factors for fraud. Models 1 and 2 indicate that higher asset growth rate and lower
book-to-market ratio are related to higher probability of fraud. Model 3 implies that fraudulent
firms are likely to have a growth rate higher than what can be supported by their internal funds.
The average marginal effect of externally financed growth on P (F ) across models is 0.64, which
means that increasing the externally financed growth by 10% tends to increase a firm’s probability
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of misreporting by 6.4%. Models 4-6 further show that fraudulent firms on average raise more
external capital, but they do not appear to be more burdened by debt. This implies that fraudulent
firms may pursue more equity financing than debt financing.
Overall, results in Table 5 imply that rapidly growing firms with insufficient internal capital
are likely to misreport their financial performance, because fraud enables them to exercise their
growth options on favorable terms.
5.5.2 Investment and Fraud
Table 6 reports the relation between firms’ investment expenditures and their fraud incen-
tives. Several interesting results emerge. First, I find that different types of investment have
differential effects on the likelihood of fraud detection. Investment in R&D has the strongest neg-
ative effect on the probability of fraud detection. The relation is statistically and economically
significant. The average marginal effect of R&D expenditures on P (D|F ) across models is -0.17,
which means that a 10% higher R&D expenditures is on average associated with a 1.7% lower prob-
ability of detection. Note that a firm’s total litigation cost is the probability of detection times the
penalty upon detection. Suppose that the penalty can be completely measured in terms of money,
then a 1.7% decrease in the detection likelihood can correspond to a substantial reduction in the
dollar value of litigation cost.
The effect of net investing cash flow on the probability of detection is also significantly
negative but much weaker than that of R&D expenditures. The average marginal effect of net
investing cash flow on P (D|F ) is -0.05. Straightforward investment like capital expenditures does
not seem to influence the likelihood of detection. Neither do acquisition expenditures. I further
examine some different measures of merger/acquisition intensity. Model 10 shows that larger the
number of acquisitions in year 0, higher the probability of detection. A possible explanation for
this result is that the regulators and the market may pay more attention to firms that are active in
mergers/acquisitions. Furthermore, Model 11 shows that more focused acquisitions (acquisitions
within the same two-digit SIC codes), higher the probability of detection. It is consistent with
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the argument in Wang (2004) that investments that have high correlation with a firm’s current
business can increase the firm’s litigation risk.
Second, different types of investment also have differential effects on firms’ propensity to
commit fraud. The differences can stem from two sources: either different investments affect
firms’ benefit from fraud differently, or they affect firms’ risk of being detected differently. Let
us compare cash-based acquisitions and stock-based acquisitions. Table 6 shows that these two
types of acquisitions have different effects on P (F ), but not on P (D|F ). Stock-based acquisitions
have a significant positive relation with P (F ), while cash-based acquisitions do not. This implies
that the financing of the investment influences firms’ benefit from committing fraud, but not the
detection risk. Then let us compare R&D expenditures and capital expenditures. In all models,
R&D expenditures are significantly positively associated with P (F ), while capital expenditures do
not influence P (F ). If these two types of investment are not generally financed differently, then
their differential effects on P (F ) should largely arise from their differential effects on P (D|F ).
Holding other factors constant, firms that invest more in R&D tend to have lower litigation risk.
Low litigation risk can encourage fraud.
5.5.3 Equity Ownership and Fraud
Table 7 presents the roles of insider equity incentives and shareholder monitoring in deter-
mining a firm’s fraud incentives. First, insider percentage stock ownership has a significant concave
relation with the probability of fraud. That is, when insider ownership is small, the probability
of fraud increases as insider ownership increases. When insider ownership is large, however, the
probability of fraud decreases as insider ownership increases. Given the dramatic increase in the
use of stock options in managers’ compensation, the percentage stock ownership will not capture
the full impact of managers’ equity incentives. Therefore, I construct an executive equity compen-
sation variable, which is the total value of an executive’s restricted stock and stock options over
her total compensation and sum over all the key executives in the company.8 Model 14 shows that
8For insider equity incentives, I have also examined various specifications of executive equity compensation other
than the one reported in Model 14. For example, I compute the average ratio rather than the sum across executives
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executive equity compensation exhibits a similar but slightly weaker concave shape.
The concavity implies that insider equity ownership (or equity compensation) can be a
double-edged sword when it is used to align the interest of the managers to that of the outside
shareholders. When insiders hold small stakes in the firm, the agency problem due to separation
of ownership and control can be severe. However, steep equity incentive scheme may not solve the
problem, because it can induce insiders to misreport rather than to work harder for the interest of
outside shareholders. Interestingly, equity incentive seems to work well only when insiders already
have substantial equity stakes in the firm.9
Second, I find that the presence of large shareholders and institutional shareholders increases
fraud detection and discourages fraud. The marginal effects of institutional ownership on P (D|F )
and P (F ) are 0.14 and -0.27, respectively. This means that a 10% increase in institutional share
holdings is associated with an average 1.4% increase in the probability of fraud detection, and an
average 2.7% decrease the probability of fraud.10 Block ownership has a similar effect. In general,
however, block ownership has a slightly stronger effect on P (F ), while institutional ownership
has a slightly stronger effect on P (D|F ). These results imply that the strength of shareholder
monitoring influences firms’ propensity to commit fraud through their impact on the likelihood
of fraud detection, and provide support for enhancing shareholder monitoring in the on-going
corporate governance reform.
in a company. I use the value of exercised stock options rather than the Black-Scholes value of all stock option
holdings. I also examine equity ownership and equity compensation of CEO. Overall, the results are qualitatively
consistent across different specifications.
9I separately examine the subsample of firms that have 20% or higher insider ownership. I find a significant
negative relation between insider ownership and the probability of fraud. This result is not reported in the tables.
10There is a caveatee regarding the interpretation of the result. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) that was passed in December 1995 requires that every class action lawsuit appoint a lead plaintiff. PSLRA
encourages large institutional investors to be lead plaintiffs. Therefore, class action suits could be more likely to go
through for firms that have large institutional investors. This may lead to the positive relation between institutional
ownership and P (D|F ).
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5.5.4 Auditor, Board and Fraud
Table 8 presents the effects of independent auditors and corporate boards on corporate
fraud incentives. The auditor being one of the five largest accounting firms appears to be related to
higher likelihood of fraud detection.11 The deterrence effect, however, is not statistically significant.
Auditor opinions seem to have no influence on detection. The reason is that auditor opinions do not
exhibit much variation at all. For the fraud sample, 79% of the auditor opinions in the year when
fraud occurred were unqualified opinions, and the rest 21% were unqualified opinions with some
explanations. The uniformly unqualified auditor opinions themselves show the problem: Why do
independent auditors seldom disagree with their clients regarding the quality of disclosure? Are
they truly independent?
On monitoring by the board of directors, models 16-17 show that board size and the percent-
age of outside directors are positively associated with the probability of detection and negatively
associated with the probability of fraud. However, the relations are not statistically significantly.
This could be due to the power issue. Unfortunately, I do not have board data for a large number
of firms in my sample (see Table 4).
5.5.5 Summary of Results
In sum, Tables 5-8 present the multivariate analysis on the effects of firm characteristics,
investment, and corporate monitoring on a firm’s probability of committing fraud and the prob-
ability of fraud detection. I find that fraudulent firms are likely to be high-growth firms that
have large needs for external capital but experience negative shocks in profitability. Performance
deterioration, although temporarily concealed by fraud, tends to reveal itself and increase fraud
detection.
Second, I find that investment can influence both firms’ ex-ante benefit from committing
fraud (e.g., through the financing of the investment) and their ex-post detection risk. Therefore,
11I take out Arthur Andersen and find similar result on the big four accounting firms. I also examine Arthur
Andersen separately, and find no significant result. Since these results are similar to what is reported in Table 8
Model 15, they are not reported.
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it is an important determinant of firms’ incentives to defraud investors. Investments with high
degree of uncertainty and/or low correlation with existing assets tend to negatively influence the
likelihood of fraud detection. These results, together with the evidence of overinvestment in Panel
B of Table 4, imply that fraud can be associated with investment distortions and thus real economic
costs.
Finally, different types of corporate monitors also appear to have different effects on fraud
propensity and fraud detection. The presence of block equity holders and high institutional hold-
ings is associated with high probability of fraud detection and low probability of fraud. There
is weak evidence that reputable independent auditors and large corporate boards increase the
likelihood of fraud detection.
5.5.6 Comparison with Simple Probit Models
Existing studies on fraud have used straight probit models to assess the effect of a factor on
a firm’s probability of committing fraud. As discussed in Section 5.2.3, the straight probit model
equates the probability of detected fraud to the probability of fraud. Therefore, it can not only
underestimate the probability of fraud, but also lead to incorrect inferences. Table 9 compares
the results from the straight probit model and the bivariate probit model, and demonstrates the
problems associated with the straight probit model. Using the full sample of comparison firms as
in the previous models (i.e., using multiple years’ data for every comparison firm) leads to very
low marginal effects of all the variables in the straight probit model. Therefore, in order to better
illustrate the differences between the straight probit and the bivarate probit models, I randomly
choose one year for every comparison firm. That is, each comparison firm only enters the regression
once in Table 9.
First, let us look at the results on R&D expenditures. The straight probit model shows no
significant effect of R&D expenditures on P (F ), while the bivariate probit model shows a strong
positive effect. The reason is that investment in R&D has opposing effects on P (F ) and P (D|F ).
The two forces roughly offset each other, resulting in no effect on the probability of detected fraud
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P (Z). Second, the marginal effects of net investing cash flows on P (F ) have consistent signs
across the two models, but substantially differ in magnitude (0.10 in probit and 0.43 in bivariate
probit). The straight probit model underestimates the marginal effect of this variable. Third, the
two models show opposing effects of institutional ownership on P (F ). The straight probit model
reports a positive effect, while the bivariate probit model reports a negative one. Again, the reason
is that institutional ownership has opposite effects on P (F ) and P (D|F ), and for this variable the
positive effect on detection dominates.
The comparisons in Table 9 clearly show that disentangling the effect of a factor on the
probability of detecting fraud and its effect on the probability of committing fraud is important
for us to draw sensible conclusions.
5.6 Robustness Checks
5.6.1 Frivolous Lawsuits
In this study, I use the filing of securities class action lawsuits to proxy for detected fraud.
However, the filing of a lawsuit does not necessarily indicate that the alleged firm is fraudulent,
because allegations could be frivolous or mistaken. Therefore, the fraud sample could be subject
to biases due to possible false detections.
Many studies in the legal literature have argued that The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA), which was passed in December 1995, makes it more difficult for shareholders
to sue a public company (see., e.g., Choi (2004)). My sample consists of litigation suits since 1996
(post PSLRA). Therefore, the probability of frivolous lawsuits in my sample should be lower than
it was before PSLRA.
In order to further mitigate the bias of false detection in the estimation, I separately exam-
ine the following three subsamples. The first subsample has 334 firms that announced accounting
restatements surrounding the securities lawsuits. The accounting restatement information is from
General Accounting Office (GAO)’s October 2003 report. Since I study accounting-related fraud,
the fact that the alleged firms restated their financial reports provides support to the allegations.
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The second subsample contains 207 firms that were subject to parallel SEC’s AAERs. Infor-
mation on AAERs is retrieved from SEC’s web site. If frivolous lawsuits could result from the
profit-orientation of private securities lawyers, then having parallel SEC’s litigation increases the
credibility of the lawsuits, because SEC is not profit-oriented. Several papers in the legal litera-
ture (see, e.g., Johson, Nelson and Pritchard (2002), Choi (2004)) have viewed suits that result
in dismissal or a low value settlement ($2 million or less) as “nuisance”. Therefore, in the last
subsample, I exclude 27 cases that were either later dismissed by the court or had a settlement less
than $2 million. The dismissal and settlement information is retrieved from the Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse (SCAC).
Table 10 shows that the main model results hold qualitatively across all three subsamples.
This implies that the possible existence of false detection does not drive the results.
5.6.2 Timing of Fraud
The beginning of a firm’s fraudulent scheme is generally a little fuzzy due to the difficulty
of tracing evidence far back in time. For accounting-related frauds, identifying the timing of fraud
can be even more difficult because the border line between aggressive accounting and securities
fraud is not always a clear cut.
In this study, I determine the beginning fiscal year of fraud (year 0) based on the specification
of class periods and firms’ fiscal year ending months. For firms that are subject to both private class
action litigation and SEC’s AAERS, I also cross check the timing of fraud using the information
in SEC’s litigation filings. To further examine the validity of the year 0 specifications, I compare
firms’ ROA based on the originally reported accounting data with ROA based on the restated data
from COMPUSTAT. Figure 5 plots the median historic and restated ROA for both the fraud and
comparison samples from year -2 to year 2. We can see that for the fraud sample, the historic
ROA and the restated ROA are consistent with each other in years -2 and -1, start to diverge in
year 0, and then re-converge in year 2. This implies that the determination of year 0 is on average
valid.
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5.6.3 Industry and Business Cycle effects
So far, this paper has focused on firm-level economic determinants of fraud. Several papers
have argued that industry and market environment also influences firms’ fraud incentives. Wang
(2004) predicts that fraudulent events tend to cluster in certain industries during certain time
period, because both the benefit from fraud and the litigation risk are correlated among firms in
the same industry. Gande and Lewis (2005) empirically document the industry spillover effect in
securities litigation. That is, the filing of lawsuits on one firm significantly negatively affects the
stock performances of other firms in the same industry. I have controlled for industry distribution
in the analysis. Here I further control for the industry securities litigation environment. I use
the logarithm of the total market value of fraudulent firms in an industry in year -1 to proxy for
industry litigation intensity. A high total market value can result from either a large number of
frauds or the existence of some mega cases.
Poval, Singh and Winton (2004) argue that firms’ fraud incentives are influenced by business-
cycle factors. Their model shows that corporate fraud incentives are low when the economic
condition is very good (investors are highly optimistic) or when it is very bad (investors are highly
skeptical). The fraud incentives are high when the economic condition is switching from good to
bad. In order to understand the effect of market-wide determinants on the probability of fraud, I
construct a business cycle variable that equals -1 if the year in which fraud begins is between 1992
and 1994 or between 2001 and 2002 (bust), equals 0 if year 0 is between 1995 and 1997 or in 2003,
and equals 1 if year 0 is between 1998 and 2000 (boom).
Table 11 shows that the main model results remain unchanged after incorporating the
industry and business cycle effects. In addition, both industry litigation intensity and business
cycle variables tend to be positively related to P (D|F ) and negatively related to P (F ). The
likelihood of fraud detection is high in industries with high litigation intensity. Good economic
conditions are also related to higher ex post detection risk. This is actually intuitive. First,
if a fraud begins in a very good year, this implies that the fraudulent firm has some negative
idiosyncratic shocks. Second, very good economic conditions may not continue. The problems
69
concealed by fraud are likely to be revealed as the overall condition weakens, which leads to the
discovery of fraud.12
5.6.4 Different Model Specifications
The model specification described in Section 5.3.4 is mainly from the firm’s viewpoint.
Companies rationally compare the expected benefit and litigation risk of engaging in fraud. The
explanatory variables in the P (F ) equation consist of variables that either influence firms’ benefit
from committing fraud or influence their litigation risk. We can extend the model into a strategic
two-party game: The firm calculates its risk of being detected when it makes the fraud decision.
The detection forces also anticipate the firm’s likelihood of committing fraud when allocating
their resources. For example, the market may be more vigilant with firms with high externally
financed growth if those firms tend to have high propensity to commit fraud. This implies that
the externally financed growth can be positively associated with the probability of fraud detection.
Therefore, in Table 11 Specification 3, if a factor affects a firm’s benefit from committing fraud
and its effect can be anticipated ex ante by the detection forces, then this factor is in both the
fraud commitment and fraud detection equations. The results show that although high externally
financed growth is an important motivational factor for fraud, it does not appear to significantly
influence firms’ probability of being detected. A possible explanation for this is that growth itself
is not necessarily a bad thing, and therefore does not necessarily trigger investor vigilance.
As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the residual ROA variable is not completely exogenous. This
variable, however, appears in all the models. In Table 11 Specification 4, I take out this variable
and examine whether the results on other variables still hold. The main results are qualitatively
unchanged. The statistical significance of variables is consistent with previous models. However,
the marginal effects of variables in the P (F ) equation are lower.
12I also use the return to a market portfolio to proxy for overall business conditions. The results are consistent with
those reported in Table 11. High market return in the beginning year of fraud is associated with high probability
of fraud detection.
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Table 5.1: Allegations of Accounting Fraud : 1996 – 2003
Panel A: Litigation Filings by Calender Year
The fraud sample consists of 684 class action lawsuits against 660 US public companies. The total
number of lawsuits each year does not include cases filed against private companies or cases against
investment companies for pure fraudulent investment banking activities (such as unfair allocation
of IPO shares and misleading analyst reports).
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1996-2003
Accounting fraud 45 70 103 80 107 88 119 71 684
Total # of lawsuits 100 163 232 195 206 168 212 177 1454
% of total 45.00 42.94 44.40 36.92 51.94 52.38 56.13 40.11 47.04
Panel B: Class Periods, Age, and Stock Exchange
The information on class periods is retrieved from the class action lawsuits. Age is defined as the
number of years between a firm’s IPO date and the beginning of its class period. A firm’s stock
exchange is identified as of the beginning of the class period.
Class Period (days) Age (years) Stock Exchange
# of obs. 660 # of obs. 652 # of obs. 660
mean 471 mean 8.16 NYSE 30.3%
median 354 median 3.45 AMEX 3.7%
maximum 2040 age<5 years 61.2% NASDAQ 64.0%
minimum 13 age>10 years 22.66% Other 2.0%
Panel C: Accounting Fraud by the Beginning Fiscal Year
The beginning fiscal year of a fraud is identified based on the specification of the class period and
the firm’s fiscal year ending month.
Fiscal year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
# of cases 1 8 15 47 86 107
Fiscal year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
# of cases 97 117 108 57 16 1
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Table 5.2: Industry Distribution of Accounting Fraud
This table reports the distribution of accounting-fraud firms across industry segments. I classify
firms into 24 industry segments based on 2-digit or 3-digit SIC codes, as detailed in the table.
Percentage of total is computed based on the total number of public firms in each industry in the
COMPUSTAT database.
Industry Fraud Events % of Sample % of Total
Agriculture (100-900) 1 0.15 1.18
Mining (1000-1400) 10 1.52 0.74
Construction (1520-1731) 1 0.15 0.78
Food & Tobacco (2000-2111) 11 1.67 2.59
Fabrics & Textile Products (2200-2390) 12 1.82 3.79
Wood & Furniture (2400-2590) 2 0.30 1.06
Paper & Printing (2600-2790) 3 0.45 0.72
Chemicals (2800-2821, 2840-2990) 4 0.61 0.82
Pharmaceutical (2833-2836) 22 3.33 2.81
Materials & Related Products (3011-3490) 18 2.73 1.89
Industry Manuf. (3510-3569, 3578-3590, 3711-3873) 49 7.42 2.44
Computer-related Hardware (3570-3577) 33 5.00 6.82
Electronics (3600-3695) 64 9.70 5.13
Miscellaneous Manuf. (3910-3990) 2 0.30 0.91
Transportation (4011-4731) 11 1.67 2.24
Telecommunications (4812-4899) 31 4.70 3.65
Utilities (4900-4991) 29 4.39 4.37
Wholesales (5000-5190) 31 4.70 3.64
Retails (5200-5990) 36 5.45 2.70
Financial Services (6021-6799) 73 11.06 1.51
Services (7000-7361, 7380-7997, 8111-8744) 66 10.00 3.72
Software & Programming (7370-7377) 115 17.42 6.13
Healthcare Services (8000-8093) 36 5.45 9.57
Others (8880-9995) 0 0.00 0.00
Total 660 100 2.96
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Table 5.3: Table 3: Nature of Accounting Fraud
This table presents the nature of the alleged financial misrepresentations in 563 securities lawsuits
studied in this paper. I am only able to identify the exact nature of the misrepresentation in 563
cases based on the information in relevant case documents (e.g., case complaints, press releases
and court decisions). I categorize these 563 cases into 11 groups based on the accounting items
that have been manipulated. I report the number of filings and the frequency of each category.
Allegations # of Filings % of Sample
# of identified cases 563
Improper revenue recognition 380 67.50
Understatement of expenses 97 17.26
Non-recurring items 4 0.71
Overstatement of account receivables 53 9.43
Overstatement of inventory 38 6.76
Overstatement of intangibles 13 2.31
Overstatement of investment 9 1.60
Overstatement of other assets 72 12.81
Understatement of reserves/allowances 49 8.72
Understatement of liability 20 3.56
Other 24 4.27
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Table 5.4: Univariate Comparisons of Firm Characteristics
For each variable, the median, the mean (in the brackets) and the z-statistics for Wilcoxon tests are
reported. ** and * indicate significance at 1 and 5% levels, respectively. “ROA”=(operating income
after depreciation)/assets. “Res. ROA” is the residual from regression: ROA1=α0 + α1ROA0 +
α2ROA−1 + ε. “B-M”=(assets)/( assets-equity+market value). “EF. Growth”=“Asset Growth”
- ROA21−ROA2 , where ROA2=(income before extraordinary items)/assets. “EF. C.F.”=(∆common
stock+∆preferred stock+∆debt)/assets. “Leverage”=(LT debt)/assets. “ST Debt”= (debt in
current liabilities)/debt. “Bank/Debt”=(bank loan)/debt. “Invest. C.F.”= -(net investing cash
flow)/assets. “Focused Acquis” is the percentage of acquisitions in which the target firm is within
the same two-digit SIC codes as the acquirer. “Insider” is the percentage ownership of officers and
directors. “Block” is the total percentage ownership of the shareholders who own at least 5% of
the firm’s equity. “Institution” is the percentage ownership of financial institutions. “Big Five”=1
if the independent auditor is one of the biggest five accounting firms, and 0 if otherwise. “Opinion”
goes from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). “B-Independ.” is the fraction of independent directors. “Equity
Comp.” is executives’ value of stock and stock option over total compensation.
Fraud Sample # of obs. Nonfraud Sample # of obs. Wilcoxon z
Assets($106) 192 (5515) 631 136 (3538) 68202 5.44**
Market Value($106) 496 (5102) 535 93 (1764) 56493 15.64**
Sales($106) 157 (2057) 627 90 (1520) 65696 6.44**
Age 2.89 (7.64) 630 6.25 (8.73) 63338 -9.00**
ROA 0.08 (-0.00) 616 0.05 (-0.06) 66634 8.03**
Res. ROA [1] -0.01 (-0.07) 545 0.02 (-0.00) 49764 -10.22**
Asset Growth 0.46 (1.09) 563 0.09 (0.36) 61470 20.03**
B-M 0.50 (0.53) 521 0.77 (0.74) 53270 -14.90**
EF. Growth 0.41 (1.08) 562 0.07 (0.39) 59819 17.94**
EF. CF. 0.19 (0.23) 551 0.04 (0.03) 59893 19.05**
Leverage 0.10 (0.17) 626 0.11 (0.18) 66873 0.45
ST Debt 0.27 (0.36) 561 0.24 (0.35) 59676 1.12
R&D 0.00 (0.05) 632 0.00 (0.05) 64389 5.04**
Invest. C.F. 0.11 (0.14) 611 0.06 (0.08) 59165 9.92**
Capital Exp. 0.04 (0.06) 614 0.04 (0.06) 56480 2.06*
Acquis.(cf.) 0.00 (0.04) 579 0.00 (0.02) 54566 15.91**
Acquis.(cf.+stock) 0.01 (0.11) 587 0.00 (0.03) 55785 17.37**
# of Acquis. 0.00 (0.79) 631 0.00 (0.14) 65047 24.07**
Focused Acquis. 0.00 (0.22) 631 0.00 (0.05) 65047 21.72**
Insider 0.15 (0.21) 599 0.09 (0.18) 37526 5.58**
Block 0.35 (0.38) 602 0.26 (0.32) 37569 6.88**
Institution 0.36 (0.39) 572 0.19 (0.26) 37506 11.38**
Big Five 1.00 (0.81) 631 1.00 (0.71) 68202 5.06**
Opinion 1.00 (1.21) 533 1.00 (1.29) 56210 -3.91**
B-Size 2.67 (3.59) 273 4.33 (4.75) 2312 -10.05**
B-Independ. 0.25 (0.29) 273 0.29 (0.34) 2617 -6.30**
Equity Comp. 2.31 (2.31) 223 1.42 (1.52) 12178 9.78**
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Table 5.5: Investment: Fraud Sample vs. Industry-Age Matched Sample
The control sample is matched with the fraud sample based on two-digit SIC codes and firm ages
(the number of years since IPO date).
Fraud Sample # of obs. Control Sample # of obs. Wilcoxon z
Age [-1] 2.89 (7.64) 630 2.90 (7.00) 630 0.13
R&D [-2,-1] 0.00 (0.07) 627 0.00 (0.06) 573 2.14*
R&D [0] 0.00 (0.05) 630 0.00 (0.05) 571 2.11*
R&D [1] 0.00 (0.06) 577 0.00 (0.06) 565 2.77**
Capital Exp. [-2,-1] 0.05 (0.06) 608 0.05 (0.06) 552 0.87
Capital Exp. [0] 0.04 (0.06) 614 0.04 (0.06) 548 1.03
Capital Exp. [1] 0.04 (0.06) 560 0.04 (0.06) 545 1.57
Acquis(cf.) [-2,-1] 0.00 (0.03) 589 0.00 (0.02) 544 3.78**
Acquis(cf.) [0] 0.00 (0.04) 579 0.00 (0.02) 536 6.47**
Acquis(cf.) [1] 0.00 (0.03) 553 0.00 (0.02) 523 4.65**
Acquis.(cf.+stock) [-2,-1] 0.01 (0.09) 595 0.00 (0.04) 550 6.53**
Acquis.(cf.+stock) [0] 0.01 (0.11) 587 0.00 (0.05) 542 9.00**
Acquis.(cf.+stock) [1] 0.00 (0.07) 544 0.00 (0.04) 509 5.10**
Invest. C.F. [-2,-1] 0.11 (0.14) 604 0.09 (0.10) 547 3.81**
Invest. C.F. [0] 0.11 (0.14) 611 0.07 (0.10) 537 4.84**
Invest. C.F. [1] 0.07 (0.09) 553 0.07 (0.07) 511 1.67
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Table 5.6: Profitability, Growth, & Fraud
This table reports the relation between firms’ profitability, growth potential, external financing
need and their propensity to commit accounting fraud. Probit coefficient estimates/marginal
effects and their t-statistics (in parentheses), the Wald Chi-squared statistics and the degree of
freedom (in parentheses) are reported. **,* indicate significance at 1 and 5% levels, respectively.
ρ is correlation between u and v in equations (1) and (2).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F )








Res. ROA - -1.16/-0.10 - -5.72/-0.72 - -1.13/-0.09
(-6.07)** (-8.04)** (-5.16)**
Log(Assets) -0.03/-0.01 0.07/0.01 0.27/0.02 -0.14/-0.02 -0.03/-0.01 0.06/0.01
(-0.44) (1.80) (7.97)** (-3.87)** (-0.41) (1.77)
Age 0.01/0.01 -0.00/-0.00 -0.01/-0.00 0.02/0.00 0.01/0.00 -0.00/-0.00
(2.57)* (-1.12) (-3.35)** (3.38)** (2.49)* (-0.98)
Tech. 0.19/0.07 0.25/0.02 -0.28/-0.02 0.58/0.09 0.03/0.01 0.30/0.03
(0.56) (1.76) (-2.12)* (5.05)** (0.08) (2.23)*
Service -0.36/-0.13 0.24/0.02 -0.16/-0.01 0.53/0.08 -0.41/-0.14 0.26/0.02
(-0.97) (1.46) (-1.02) (4.34)** (-1.12) (1.62)
Trade -0.57/-0.22 0.51/0.06 0.37/0.04 0.21/0.03 -0.63/-0.23 0.51/0.06
(-1.40) (2.48)* (2.02)* (1.68) (-1.59) (2.63)**
Constant 0.02 -2.26 -1.43 -1.25 0.25 -2.27
(0.02) (-18.97)** (-6.63)** (-4.15)** (0.32) (-19.48)**
ρ (p-value) -0.49 (0.06) -0.33 (0.05) -0.56 (0.06)
Log Likelihood -2431.56 -2201.25 -2415.48
χ2(d.f.) 112.43 (13) 425.41 (13) 107.44 (13)
# of obs. 50137 45354 49019
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Table 5.7: External Financing & Fraud
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F )
ROA 0.39/0.07 1.08/0.39 1.18/0.45
(2.14)* (3.35)** (3.94)**








Res. ROA - -3.60/-0.71 - -1.17/-0.10 - -1.29/-0.11
(-8.75)** (-5.70)** (-6.53)**
Log(Assets) 0.30/0.05 -0.18/-0.04 -0.03/-0.01 0.07/0.01 -0.03/-0.01 0.07/0.01
(9.15)** (-5.58)** (-0.47) (1.82) (-0.33) (1.56)
Age -0.02/-0.00 0.02/0.00 0.01/0.01 -0.00/-0.00 0.01/0.01 -0.00/-0.00
(-4.03)** (4.45)** (2.59)** (-1.11) (2.24)* (-0.95)
Tech. -0.00/-0.00 0.43/0.10 0.18/0.07 0.24/0.02 0.21/0.08 0.24/0.02
(-0.02) (3.12)** (0.55) (1.75) (0.58) (1.62)
Service -0.56/-0.09 0.60/0.13 -0.34/-0.13 0.24/0.02 -0.36/-0.14 0.25/0.02
(-2.64)** (3.90)** (-0.93) (1.44) (-0.87) (1.34)
Trade -0.49/-0.07 0.72/0.19 -0.56/-0.22 0.50/0.06 -0.57/-0.22 0.51/0.06
(-1.79) (3.12)** (-1.39) (2.45)* (-1.28) (2.33)*
Constant -2.51 -0.78 0.03 -2.25 -0.12 -2.26
(-9.67)** (-2.39)* (0.04) (-18.75)** (-0.17) (-17.81)**
ρ (p-value) -0.19 (0.32) -0.50 (0.08) -0.45 (0.07)
Log Likelihood -2335.23 -2424.07 -2417.36
χ2(d.f.) 352.63 (14) 105.96 (14) 124.91 (14)
# of obs. 49146 49585 49677
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Table 5.8: Investment, Fraud Propensity & Detection
This table reports the regression results on the relation between investment and fraud. Probit
coefficient estimates/marginal effects and their t-statistics (in parentheses), the Wald Chi-squared
statistics and the degree of freedom (in parentheses) are reported. **,* indicate significance at 1
and 5% levels, respectively. ρ is correlation between u and v in equations (1) and (2).
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F )
ROA 1.74/0.29 1.84/0.35 12.71/0.80
(4.86)** (4.97)** (4.48)**
EF. Growth 1.61/0.27 1.64/0.31 2.27/0.67
(3.43)** (3.48)** (4.38)**
R&D 3.42/0.58 -1.50/-0.13 3.71/0.71 -1.56/-0.14 2.61/0.63 -1.57/-0.16
(4.70)** (-5.06)** (4.69)** (-4.91)** (3.24)** (-3.48)**
Invest. CF. 0.99/0.17 -0.32/-0.03
(2.27)* (-2.10)*
Capital Exp. -0.57/-0.11 0.15/0.01 -0.97/-0.29 0.26/0.02





Res. ROA - -1.03/-0.09 - -1.13/-0.10 - -1.44/-0.10
(-7.71)** (-7.42)** (-4.93)**
Log(Asset) 0.00/0.00 0.04/0.00 -0.01/-0.00 0.06/0.00 0.05/0.01 0.03/0.00
(0.02) (1.18) (-0.20) (1.64) (0.58) (1.02)
Age 0.01/0.00 -0.00/-0.00 0.01/0.00 -0.00/-0.00 0.01/0.00 0.00/0.00
(1.90) (-0.75) (2.10)* (-0.81) (1.23) (0.24)
Tech -0.32/-0.06 0.40/0.04 -0.24/-0.05 0.37/0.04 -0.19/-0.06 0.37/0.03
(-1.18) (3.10)** (-0.82) (2.55)* (-0.53) (3.12)**
Service -0.25/-0.04 0.24/0.02 -0.23/-0.05 0.24/0.02 -0.36/-0.11 0.30/0.02
(-0.86) (1.67) (-0.82) (1.44) (-1.08) (2.29)*
Trade -0.56/-0.12 0.46/0.05 -0.49/-0.12 0.44/0.05 -0.28/-0.09 0.32/0.03
(-1.68) (2.58)** (-1.44) (2.31)* (-0.71) (1.89)
Constant 0.65 -2.06 0.69 -2.14 -0.19 -2.23
(1.18) (-15.07)** (1.25) (-14.94)** (-0.17) (-15.21)**
ρ (p-value) -0.80 (0.00) -0.79 (0.00) -0.54 (0.19)
Log Likelihood -2300.92 -2187.11 -2099.20
χ2(d.f.) 134.03 (17) 129.77 (19) 114.44 (19)
# of obs. 43920 41482 41930
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Table 5.9: Investment, Fraud Propensity & Detection (Continued)
Model 10 Model 11
P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F )
ROA 1.75/0.25 1.77/0.22
(3.45)** (3.87)**
EF. Growth 1.80/0.25 1.83/0.23
(3.00)** (2.90)**
R&D 3.11/0.44 -1.37/-0.10 3.34/0.42 -1.42/-0.09
(2.69)** (-3.14)** (3.35)** (-3.88)**
Invest. CF. 0.80/0.11 -0.31/-0.02 1.09/0.14 -0.41/-0.03
(1.66) (-1.96)* (2.29)* (-2.46)*
# of Acquis 0.36/0.05 0.09/0.01 0.34/0.04 0.07/0.01
(1.63) (4.60)** (1.58) (3.47)**
Focused Acquis -0.73/-0.09 0.37/0.02
(-2.67)** (3.80)**
Res. ROA - -1.04/-0.07 - -1.02/-0.07
(-4.87)** (-6.22)**
Log(Asset) 0.15/0.02 -0.03/-0.00 0.17/0.02 -0.03/-0.00
(1.62) (-1.04) (1.82) (-1.28)
Age -0.00/-0.00 0.00/0.00 -0.00/-0.00 0.00/0.00
(-0.45) (0.80) (-0.29) (0.70)
Tech. -0.64/-0.11 0.51/0.05 -0.59/-0.09 0.49/0.04
(-2.57)* (5.27)** (-2.20)* (4.83)**
Service -0.57/-0.09 0.33/0.03 -0.61/-0.09 0.35/0.03
(-1.79) (2.99)** (-1.84) (3.16)**
Trade -0.76/-0.16 0.50/0.05 -0.98/-0.21 0.59/0.06
(-2.11)* (3.10)** (-2.56)* (3.44)**
Constant 0.21 -1.94 0.23 -1.96
(0.20) (-14.84)** (0.28) (-16.00)**
ρ (p-value) -0.75 (0.07) -0.75 (0.02)
Log Likelihood -2262.09 -2252.92
χ2(d.f.) 164.86 (19) 209.68 (21)
# of obs. 43920 43920
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Table 5.10: Insider Equity Incentive, Corporate Monitoring & Fraud
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F )
ROA 2.06/0.82 2.11/0.81 2.87/1.14
(5.05)** (5.76)** (3.80)**
EF. Growth 1.63/0.65 1.75/0.68 2.09/0.84
(4.97)** (6.90)** (2.53)*
R&D 3.32/1.32 -2.11/-0.28 2.83/1.09 -1.89/-0.25 1.77/0.71 -2.40/-0.20
(3.52)** (-4.53)** (2.83)** (-3.96)** (1.50) (-2.46)*
Invest. CF. 1.70/0.67 -0.54/-0.07 1.50/0.58 -0.69/-0.09 1.63/0.65 -1.08/-0.18











Institution -0.69/-0.27 1.08/0.14 -0.68/-0.27 0.35/0.06
(-2.03)* (6.39)** (-1.25) (1.08)
Res. ROA - -1.98/-0.27 - -2.06/-0.28 - -3.42/-0.60
(-7.20)** (-5.93)** (-5.83)**
Log(Asset) 0.26/0.10 -0.06/-0.01 0.23/0.09 -0.08/-0.01 0.11/0.05 -0.05/-0.01
(3.81)** (-1.71) (4.07)** (-2.86)** (1.31) (-1.02)
Age -0.01/-0.00 0.01/0.00 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00 0.01/0.00 0.01/0.00
(-1.17) (1.66) (0.04) (0.71) (1.49) (2.86)**
Tech. -0.29/-0.11 0.60/0.10 0.03/0.01 0.40/0.06 0.21/0.08 0.43/0.09
(-1.07) (4.66)** (0.10) (2.66)** (0.43) (1.57)
Service -0.59/-0.23 0.59/0.10 -0.32/-0.12 0.50/0.08 -0.21/-0.08 0.79/0.18
(-1.98)* (4.06)** (-0.99) (2.98)** (-0.40) (2.75)**
Trade -0.74/-0.27 0.65/0.12 -0.76/-0.26 0.73/0.14 -1.05/-0.38 1.16/0.31
(-2.33)* (3.59)** (-2.23)* (3.44)** (-1.79) (2.48)*
Constant -1.59 -1.75 -2.01 -1.54 -1.66 -1.53
(-2.66)** (-8.73)** (-3.32)** (-8.94)** (-1.80) (-3.40)**
ρ (p-value) -0.39 (0.05) -0.36 (0.11) -0.51 (0.02)
Log Likelihood -1999.62 -1923.87 -765.64
χ2(d.f.) 256.28 (21) 236.42 (21) 115.10 (21)
# of obs. 29439 29330 8747
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Table 5.11: Independent Auditor, Corporate Board & Fraud
Model 15 Model 16 Model 17
P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F )
ROA 2.08/0.83 1.72/0.63 1.79/0.69
(5.00)** (2.46)* (2.56)*
EF. Growth 1.63/0.65 3.64/1.35 3.60/1.38
(5.38)** (4.89)** (4.56)**
R&D 3.33/1.33 -2.04/-0.24 5.28/1.95 -3.14/-1.24 5.21/2.00 -3.01/-1.18
(3.27)** (-4.39)** (3.05)** (-2.58)** (3.12)** (-2.58)**
Invest. CF. 1.67/0.66 -0.53/-0.06 1.42/0.52 -0.81/-0.32 1.45/0.56 -0.78/-0.30
(2.84)** (-2.25)* (1.71) (-1.46) (1.71) (-1.43)
Insider 1.61/0.64 1.21/0.45 1.58/0.61
(2.53)* (1.03) (1.33)
(Insider)2 -2.38/-0.95 1.45/0.54 0.96/0.37
(-2.69)** (0.76) (0.51)
Block -1.04/-0.41 0.79/0.09 -0.26/-0.09 0.26/0.10 -0.24/-0.09 0.19/0.08
(-2.26)* (3.44)** (-0.61) (0.66) (-0.58) (0.50)








Res. ROA - -1.94/-0.23 - -2.28/-0.90 - -2.16/-0.85
(-7.01)** (-3.90)** (-3.96)**
Log(Asset) 0.26/0.10 -0.07/-0.01 0.09/0.03 -0.36/-0.14 0.08/0.03 -0.30/-0.12
(3.79)** (-2.19)* (0.65) (-5.61)** (0.70) (-5.82)**
Age -0.01/-0.00 0.01/0.00 0.01/0.00 0.00/0.00 0.01/0.00 0.00/0.00
(-1.66) (1.78) (1.78) (0.69) (1.70) (0.62)
Tech. -0.22/-0.09 0.53/0.08 0.09/0.03 0.49/0.19 -0.02/-0.01 0.51/0.20
(-0.76) (3.82)** (0.21) (1.92) (-0.05) (1.91)
Service -0.43/-0.17 0.47/0.07 -0.32/-0.11 1.43/0.51 -0.50/-0.18 1.52/0.54
(-1.33) (3.05)** (-0.52) (4.51)** (-0.96) (4.52)**
Trade -0.69/-0.25 0.60/0.10 -0.88/-0.27 1.83/0.58 -1.06/-033 1.86/0.59
(-1.99)* (3.07)** (–1.28) (3.02)** (-1.78) (3.06)**
Constant -1.52 -1.97 -2.01 1.34 -2.08 1.21
(-2.32)* (-8.18)** (-3.52)** (2.70)** (-3.55)** (2.68)**
ρ (p-value) -0.38 (0.42) -0.30 (0.56) -0.38 (0.35)
Log Likelihood -1833.71 -481.81 -482.16
χ2(d.f.) 229.88 (24) 109.18 (23) 105.99 (23)
# of obs. 29225 2186 2186
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Table 5.12: Bivariate Probit Model vs. Straight Probit Model
This table compares the results from the following two statistical models:
Bivariate probit model: P (Zi = 1) = P (Fi = 1)P (Di = 1);
Straight probit model: P (Zi = 1) = P (Fi = 1).
Both models are estimated using a random comparison sample without repetition. That is, every
comparison firm only enters the estimation once. The probit coefficent estimates/marginal effects
and their t-statistics (in parentheses), the Wald Chi-squared statistics and the degree of freedom
(in parentheses) are reported. **, * indicate significance at 1 and 5% levels, respectively. ρ is
correlation between u and v in equations (1) and (2).
Probit Bivariate Probit
P (F ) P (F ) P (D|F )
ROA 1.04/0.18 2.34/0.65
(4.16)** (5.45)**
EF. Growth 0.24/0.04 2.65/0.74
(6.97)** (5.41)**
R&D -0.49/-0.08 3.51/1.29 -2.71/-0.97
(-1.17) (3.42)** (-4.72)**
Invest. CF. 0.59/0.10 1.46/0.43 -0.80/-0.25
(2.59)** (2.59)** (-2.54)**




Institution 0.98/0.17 -0.61/-0.20 1.30/0.48
(7.58)** (-1.96)* (5.82)**
Res. ROA -2.12/-0.36 - -2.94/-0.85
(-8.09)** (-6.31)**
Log(Asset) 0.04/0.01 0.28/0.07 -0.11/-0.03
(2.18)* (4.12)** (-2.86)**
Age 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00 0.01/0.00
(1.13) (0.26) (2.03)*
Tech. 0.53/0.11 0.13/0.04 0.41/0.17
(6.17)** (0.44) (2.13)*
Service 0.43/0.08 -0.17/-0.07 0.50/0.17
(5.34)** (-0.55) (2.48)**
Trade 0.27/0.05 -0.53/-0.30 0.66/0.37
(2.73)** (-1.61) (2.58)**
Constant -2.39 -2.26 -0.44
(-17.78)** (-4.32)** (-1.88)
ρ (p-value) -0.49 (0.03)
Log Likelihood -1100.36 -1007.66
χ2(d.f.) 275.66 (13) 219.26 (21)
# of obs. 3336 3336
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Table 5.13: Frivolous Lawsuits
This table presents robustness checks of the main results over three subsamples: (1) 334 out of 660
firms that announced accounting restatements before or after the lawsuits; (2) 207 out of 660 firms
that were subject to both private class action litigation and the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement; (3)exclusion of 27 nuisance cases. A case is considered as a nuisance case if it is later
dismiss by the court or if it leads to a less than two million dollar settlement. The probit coefficent
estimates/marginal effects and their t-statistics (in parentheses), the Wald Chi-squared statistics
and the degree of freedom (in parentheses) are reported. **, * indicate significance at 1 and 5%
levels, respectively. ρ is correlation between u and v in equations (1) and (2).
Restatements SEC Enforcement Non-Nuisance Suits
P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F )
ROA 2.55/0.66 2.40/0.66 1.99/0.77
(4.39)** (3.62)** (5.60)**
EF. Growth 1.89/0.49 1.45/0.40 1.67/0.64
(5.48)** (3.55)** (6.84)**
R&D 3.31/0.86 -2.01/-0.14 3.18/0.87 -2.25/-0.14 2.81/1.08 -1.90/-0.25
(3.33)** (-3.83)** (1.98)* (-2.11)* (2.49)** (-3.49)**
Invest. C.F. 1.97/0.51 -0.53/-0.04 2.00/0.55 -0.96/-0.06 1.31/0.51 -0.68/-0.09
(2.78)** (-1.96)* (1.84) (-2.00)* (2.02)* (-2.51)*
Insider 1.91/0.50 1.83/0.50 1.78/0.69
(2.09)* (1.60) (2.96)**
(Insider)2 –2.27/-0.59 -2.58/-0.71 -2.22/-0.85
(-1.82) (-1.40) (-2.62)**
Institution -0.63/-0.16 1.11/0.08 -0.88/-0.24 1.21/0.08 -0.73/-0.28 1.12/0.15
(-1.50) (5.49)** (-0.99) (2.93)** (-2.02)* (6.38)**
Res. ROA - -2.47/-0.17 - -2.31/-0.15 - -2.05/-0.27
(-7.07)** (-4.49)** (-5.19)**
Log(Asset) 0.18/0.05 -0.05/-0.00 0.09/0.03 -0.01/-0.00 0.23/0.09 -0.08/-0.01
(1.83) (-0.99) (0.66) (-0.09) (4.06)** (-2.79)**
Age 0.01/0.00 0.00/0.00 0.01/0.00 -0.00/-0.00 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00
(0.97) (0.20) (1.38) (-0.65) (0.14) (0.74)
Tech. 0.14/0.04 0.35/0.03 0.45/0.13 -0.01/-0.00 0.05/0.02 0.39/0.06
(0.37) (1.75) (1.01) (-0.02) (0.16) (2.46)*
Service -0.17/-0.4 0.26/0.02 0.17/0.05 -0.15/-0.01 -0.31/-0.12 0.50/0.08
(-0.38) (1.15) (0.17) (-0.23) (-0.95) (2.72)**
Trade -0.74/-0.14 0.73/0.08 -0.21/-0.05 0.26/0.02 -0.76/-0.26 0.74/0.15
(-1.65) (2.82)** (-0.26) (0.48) (-2.20)* (3.28)**
Constant -2.62 -2.06 -2.20 -1.98 -1.96 -1.55
(-4.17)** (-9.04)** (-1.83) (-6.82)** (-3.15)** (-8.78)**
ρ (p-value) 0.02 (0.93) -0.15 (0.72) -0.37 (0.11)
Log Likelihood -1141.10 -740.56 -1859.72
χ2(d.f.) 196.18 (21) 113.22 (21) 239.00 (21)
# of obs. 29117 29021 29312
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Table 5.14: Different Model Specifications
This table presents robustness checks of the main results across different model specifications.
“Ind. Lit” is the logarithm of the total market value of fraudulent firms in an industry in year
-1. “Cycle”=-1 for years between 1992 and 1994 and between 2001 and 2002 (bust), =0 for years
between 1995 and 1997, and =1 for years between 1998 and 2000 (boom).
Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F ) P (F ) P (D|F )
ROA 1.90/0.75 1.61/0.64 0.39/0.04
(4.93)** (2.66)** (1.97)*
EF. Growth 1.56/0.62 1.34/0.53 -0.03/-0.00 0.55/0.06
(5.42)** (2.52)* (-0.67) (2.27)*
R&D 3.07/1.22 -1.93/-0.23 2.78/1.10 -1.97/-0.29 2.34/0.26 -1.56/-0.20
(2.98)** (-3.79)** (2.78)** (-3.10)** (3.69)** (-4.20)**
Invest. C.F. 1.68/0.67 -0.60/-0.07 1.58/0.63 -0.66/-0.10 1.02/0.11 -0.65/-0.08
(2.92)** (-2.49)* (2.53)** (-1.80) (3.39)** (-3.37)**
Insider 1.71/0.68 2.45/0.97 -0.59/-0.09 0.44/0.05
(2.88)** (3.26)** (-1.85) (1.98)*
(Insider)2 -2.41/-0.96 -2.31/-0.91 -0.65/-0.07
(-2.95)** (-2.91)** (-1.93)
Block -1.00/-0.40 0.78/0.09 -1.31/-0.52 1.04/0.15 -0.75/-0.08 0.71/0.09
(-2.21)* (3.24)** (-2.65)** (2.76)** (-1.98)* (2.26)*
Ind. Lit. (*103) -0.77/-0.31 0.70/0.08 -1.00/-0.40 0.90/0.13 -0.97/-0.11 0.89/0.12
(-0.99) (1.75) (-1.20) (1.64) (-2.02)* (2.54)*
Cycle -0.21/-0.08 0.31/0.04 -0.19/-0.07 0.30/0.04 -0.38/-0.04 0.38/0.05
(-1.73) (5.70)** (-1.19) (4.34)** (-6.05)** (7.00)**
Res. ROA - -1.89/-0.23 - -1.86/-0.28 - -
(-6.43)** (-5.88)**
Log(Asset) 0.26/0.10 -0.05/-0.01 0.28/0.11 -0.08/-0.01 0.04/0.00 0.00/0.00
(3.46)** (-1.48) (2.60)** (-1.00) (0.83) (0.04)
Age -0.01/-0.00 0.01/0.00 -0.01/-0.00 0.01/0.00 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00
(-1.04) (1.50) (-0.70) (0.91) (0.16) (0.06)
Tech -0.24/-0.10 0.52/0.08 -0.24/-0.10 0.52/0.09 -0.43/-0.06 0.46/0.07
(-0.93) (3.96)** (-1.01) (3.71)** (-2.36)* (3.28)**
Service -0.54/-0.21 0.52/0.08 -0.54/-0.21 0.53/0.10 -0.50/-0.07 0.48/0.08
(-1.81) (3.51)** (-1.90) (2.91)** (-2.61)** (3.24)**
Trade -0.82/-0.31 0.67/0.12 -0.84/-0.32 0.73/0.15 -0.81/-0.14 0.72/0.14
(-2.51)* (3.66)** (-2.73)** (3.45)** (-3.49)** (3.77)**
Constant -1.21 -1.92 -1.21 -1.63 1.71 -2.05
(-1.79) (-9.05)** (-1.85) (-3.26)** (5.18)** (-11.09)**
ρ (p-value) -0.45 (0.04) -0.55 (0.02) -0.99 (0.00)
Log Likelihood -1959.12 -1955.92 -2183.13
χ2(d.f.) 291.98 (25) 311.90 (27) 336.68 (24)
# of obs. 29439 29439 31696
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Figure 3: Determination of the Beginning Fiscal Year of Fraud  
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Figure 4: Identification Problem 
















Figure 5: Timing of Fraud 
 
             























Note: ROA is the ratio of net income over total assets.    I use net income because the restated information 
on this variable is more complete than the one on other accounting measures such as income before 
extraordinary items and operating income.   The purpose here is to compare the originally reported data 





This thesis analyzes corporate securities fraud and its consequences. The theory model
shows that fraud can lead to investment distortions in both fraudulent firms and honest firms,
which is the real economic cost of fraud. The investment distortion is twofold. On one hand, fraud
can inflate short-term firm value and allow the firm to invest using cheap outside capital. On the
other hand, once committed fraud, the firm has incentive to strategically use investment to mask
fraud. The incentive to disguise fraud can not only induce the firm to overinvest, but also gives
the firm a preference for risk and suboptimal diversification.
The theory model also characterizes the endogenous cost-benefit tradeoff of committing
fraud and derives the firm’s equilibrium disclosure strategy. The model shows that the cost and
benefit of fraud are endogenously related, which results in the optimal size of fraud and the firm’s
equilibrium fraud propensity. In particular, the theory demonstrates the important role of the
endogenous detection risk in determining the cross-sectional variations in firms’ fraud incentives.
The model generates testable implications about the economic determinants of cross-sectional
differences in fraud propensities and the relationship between fraud and corporate investment in-
centives. The theory predicts that fraudulent firms tend to have good growth prospects, but
experience negative profitability shocks. Litigation events tend to cluster in certain industries
during some specific time period. The theory also predicts that fraudulent firms tend to overin-
vest. Investment can negatively influence the firm’s litigation risk. The type of investment that
introduces the most valuation imprecision has the strongest effect on the likelihood of fraud detec-
tion. The investment, however, can be inefficient and can result in long-term underperformance of
fraudulent firms.
I also empirically investigate the economic determinants of firms’ propensity to commit
accounting fraud and the probability of fraud detection, using a sample of public companies that
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were subject to federal private securities class action litigation between 1996 and 2003. I use
econometric methods to control for the unobservability of undetected frauds, and disentangle the
effect of a factor on a firm’s probability of committing fraud and its effect on the firm’s probability
of being detected. The separation of fraud commitment and fraud detection allows me to examine
the economics of each probability as well as their interactions.
The results of this study show that investment, strength of corporate monitoring, insider
equity incentives, and some firm characteristics significantly influence a firm’s cost-benefit tradeoff
of engaging in fraud. First, the level, type, and financing of investment types of investment all
matter in dertermining a firm’s ex-post probability of fraud detection and ex-ante propensity
to commit fraud. Second, different types of corporate monitors have different effects on firms’
fraud incentives. The presence of block equity holders and large institutional ownership tends to
increase the likelihood of fraud detection and discourage fraud. The roles of independent auditors
and board of directors appear to be weaker. Third, there is a concave relation between insider
equity incentive and the probability of fraud. When insider equity incentive is small, increasing
equity incentive can have the unintended effect of increasing the probability of fraud. When insider
equity incentives is already large, such effect disappears. This implies that insider equity incentive
can be a double-edged sword when it is used to align managerial and shareholder interests in
dispersely-owned firms. Finally, high growth potential, large external financing need, and (hidden)
negative profitability shocks seem to be important motivational factors for fraud.
This study also demonstrates the importance of disentangling the probability of committing
fraud and the probability of detecting fraud, because cross-sectional variables can have opposing
effects on the two latent probabilities, and therefore can be masked in their overall effect on the
incidence of detected fraud. Ignoring this structure can lead us to draw incorrect inferences about
the determinants of corporate fraud.
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Chapter 7
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The market value of the firm at time 2 after the investment announcement is
V2(I, y) = E(V3|I, y) = E(A|I, y) + IE(R|I),
E(R|I) = E(R|R > rc) = R + IσRm(zc),




The investment condition is
(1− β)[E(Ã|e) + Ir]− PIfη > E(Ã|e)− PNfη, (7.1)
where β = I/V2(I, y). Solving for r, we get
r >
E(Ã|e)
E(Ã|I, y) + IσRm(zc)
− (PN − PI)fη
(1− β)I . (7.2)
This leads to equation (4.23). The left-hand side of equation (4.23) monotonically increases in rc,
while the right-hand side monotonically decreases in rc. Therefore, there exists a unique solution
to equation (4.23), r∗c .
Proof of Proposition 2
PI < PN if and only if ΦI < ΦN , or equivalently vc,I+KI < vc,N+KN . vc,I+KI is a function
of IσR, while vc,N + KN is not. Let M = e + C/f − y, and ρI = cov(e, V3|I)/(σe
√
V ar(V3|I)).
























< 1, then ∂νI∂(IσR) < 0 and
∂ρI
∂(IσR)








≤ ρ ≤ 1, then ∂νI∂(IσR) > 0 but
∂ρI
∂(IσR)
< 0. Therefore, there









vc,N + KN does not depend on IσR and vc,I + KI decreases with IσR, there exists a cutoff value
IσR, such that when IσR ≥ IσR, vc,I + KI ≤ vc,N + KN .
Proof of Proposition 3
Note that E(A|I, y) + IσRm(zc) = V2(I, y)− I. Let us take derivative with respect to η on









N − P ′I)fη + (PN − PI)f
(1− β)I
− (PN − PI)fη(−∂β/∂η)
(1− β)2I . (7.5)





= (1− p)(φNνN − φIνI)∂V2(I, y)
∂η
,
where φ = ∂Φ(s)/∂s.
β = IV2(I,y) is the fractional ownership of the new shareholders. V2(I, y) does not directly
depend on η, since the market does not observe η. From the manager’s point of view, however,
what is important is how much V2(I, y) will be different from V2(I, e) if the manager reports one





V2(I, y)− V2(I, e)










If y(e) 6= e does not generate any effect on the market valuation (i.e., V2(I, y) = V2(I, e)), then
∂β/∂η = 0.
As long as misreporting can increase the market value of the firm’s assets, i.e., ∂V2(I,y)∂η ≥ 0,
then ∂β/∂η < 0. Substitute these relations into (7.5), and we have ∂rc∂η < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
90
The first-order condition for the maximization problem (4.20) is
∂Π
∂η
+ g = 0; (7.8)
gη = 0, (7.9)







)[(1− β)E(V3|I, e)− E(V3|N, e)]
+ λ[1− Φ(zc)][(−∂β
∂η







(PN − PI) + λ[1− Φ(zc)]P ′I + (1− λ[1− Φ(zc)])P ′N}fη
− Pf. (7.10)
The following steps present the derivations of the equilibrium strategy specified in Proposition 4.
Step 1: A Conjecture. Suppose that there exists a cutoff earnings realization ec such that
the manager will honestly reveal the earnings if the true earnings realization is above ec, and the
manager would like to overreport earnings if the true realization is below ec. Mathematically,
y(e) = e or η(e) = 0, if e ≥ ec;
y(e) > e or η(e) > 0, if e < ec.
Given the above conjecture about the manager’s fraud incentives, the market’s reaction to
an earnings announcement can be as follows. When investors observe the announced earnings y(e),
they rationally infer e′ = y(e)−η, using their prior belief about the probability of misreporting π0.
η is the market’s expected amount of misreporting. The time 1 conditional probability of fraud is
π1 = Prob.(misreporting|y ≥ ec). Therefore, whenever y ≥ ec, investors believe that
e′ = y > ec, with probability (1− π1);
e′ = y − η1 < ec, with probability π1.
When investors observe y < ec, they rationally discount the earnings announcement, and e′ =
y − η2. Then the market value of the firm’s assets in place after the earnings announcement is
V1(y ≥ ec) = (1− π1)E(Ã|e′ = y) + π1E(Ã|e′ = y − η1); (7.11)
V1(y < ec) = E(Ã|e′ = y − η2). (7.12)
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η1 and η2 are the market’s expected amount of misreporting given y ≥ ec and y < ec, respectively.
In equilibrium, they should be equal to the manager’s optimal choice of misreporting in the two
earnings announcement scenarios.
η ≥ 0 and the structure of litigation cost of fraud naturally leads to a conjecture that η(e)
is monotonic in e in each different region specified above. This does not imply, however, that y(e)
is always monotonic in e (due to the pooling of the two types of firm). Then in each of the two
scenarios (fraud or honest) there is a one-for-one mapping between e and y(e). This implies that
under each scenario, e′ = y(e)−η is still normally distributed. Therefore, given the true realization
of earnings e, when y ≥ ec,
∂V2(I, y)
∂η
= δ(1− π1) > 0. (7.13)




Step 2: Deriving ec. Let us plug equation (7.13) and (7.14) into (7.10) and differentiate with




P ′N = (1− p)δ(1− π1)φNνN > 0;
P ′′N = (1− p)δ(1− π1)φN |vc,N + KN |νN > 0;
P ′N = (1− p)δ(1− π1)φIνI > 0;
P ′′I = (1− p)δ(1− π1)φI |vc,I + KI |νI > 0,




This means that the objective function is globally concave. There exists a unique maximizer
η∗ = η∗1 . The concavity and the nonnegative η constraint imply that
∂Π
∂η
|η=0 > 0 ⇒ η∗1 > 0,
∂Π
∂η
|η=0 ≤ 0 ⇒ η∗1 = 0.
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I define the following notations. β0 = β(y = e) = I/V2(I, e), rc,0 = rc(η = 0), zc,0 = (rc,0−R)/σR,
φ0 = φ(zc,0), Φ0 = Φ(zc,0), and m0 = m(zc,0). Then plug η = 0 into equation (7.10), and we have
∂Π
∂η
|η=0 = λ(1− Φ0){Im0(−∂rc
∂η




|η=0 = −E(A|e)δ(1− π1)[V2(I, e)− I]2 .
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (7.15) decreases as e increases, while the second
term does not depend on e. Therefore, we can find a cutoff ec, such that ∂Π∂η |η=0 > 0 if e < ec, and
∂Π




Step 3: Deriving eh. To facilitate the analysis below, it is convenient to decompose ∂Π∂η into
a marginal benefit of fraud term and a marginal cost of fraud term. Let




)[(1− β)E(V3|I, e)− E(V3|N, e)] (7.16)
+ λ[1− Φ(zc)][(−∂β
∂η









(PN − PI) + λ[1− Φ(zc)]∂PI
∂η














The relations about the first derivatives mean that when the true earnings realization is
low, the marginal benefit of fraud is relatively high, while the marginal cost of fraud is relatively













This means that if the firm overreports earnings, there is an upper limit for how large the announced
earnings could be. Then if the market observes y > eh, the market rationally believes that y = e.
Step 4: Deriving el. Similarly, given that η∗1(e) is a decreasing and concave function of
e, there also exists a lower bound el such that when e < el, y(e) = e + η∗1(e) < ec, and when
el ≤ e < ec, y(e) = e + η∗1(e) ≥ ec. el is the solution to the following equation:
MB[η1(el)] = MC[η1(el)],
where η1(el) = ec − el.
When the firm announces y < ec, however, the market reaction changes, because now the
low-earnings firm is not pooled with the high-earnings firm. In other words, the benefit-cost
tradeoff is different, which implies that the optimal amount of misreporting in this region should
be different from η∗1 .
Let η2(e) be the manager’s misreporting strategy when e < el. If η2(e) is a monotonic
function of e, then y(e) = e + η2(e) < ec is also a monotonic function of e. In other words, y(e) is
a sufficient statistic of e, and thus E(A|y) = E(A|e). Substitute E(A|y) = E(A|e) into equations
(4.17), (4.18), (4.23), (7.16) and (7.17), and we get ∂rc∂η = 0, MB = 0, and MC = pf > 0. Since the
marginal benefit is less than the marginal cost regardless of η, the optimal amount of misreporting
is η∗2 = 0. Put differently, if the manager chooses a monotonic disclosure strategy when e < el,
then the optimal monotonic strategy is y(e) = e.
Step 5: Possibility of η(e) as a nonmonotonic function of e. Let us also consider whether
there exists an equilibrium in which η2(e) is a nonmonotonic function of e. Since η ≥ 0 (which
means y(e) ≥ e), and the litigation cost is an increasing and monotonic function of η, I can make
the following conjecture about η2(e). I can partition the earnings space {e : e < el} into many
intervals, [e1, el), [e2, e1), [e3, e2).... In each earnings interval, y(e) equals the upper bound of that
interval. The lower bound of each interval is determined, such that the earnings realization at the
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lower bound plus the optimal amount of misreporting equals the upper bound earnings value. Take
the first interval [e1, el) for an example. If the true earnings realization is in this interval, then the
manager announces y(e) = el. The market rationally infers that e′ = E(e|e1 ≤ e < el) and uses
e′ to price the firm’s assets in place. It is easy to see that firms with e′ < e < el get worse off by
reporting y(e) = el than reporting y(e) = e, because the firm’s asset value is underpriced by the
market, and the firm faces potential litigation cost. Then these firms would rather honestly reveal
their earnings, and the conjectured equilibrium collapses. This happens to any nonmonotonic
η2(e).
Proof of Proposition 5









)[(1− β)E(V3|I, e)− E(V3|N, e)]
+ (1− Φ(zc))[(−∂β
∂η






= −λ[1− Φ(zc)](PN − PI)fη < 0. (7.19)
Since the marginal benefit of fraud increases in λ and the marginal cost decreases in λ, η∗1(e)










This implies that ∂ec∂λ > 0.
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[45] Peng, Lin, and Ailsa Röell, 2004, “Executive pay, earnings manipulation and shareholder
litigation,” working paper, Princeton University.
[46] Poirier, Dale J., 1980, “Partial observability in bivariate probit models,” Journal of Econo-
metrics 12, 209-217.
[47] Povel, Paul, Rajdeep Singh, and Andrew Winton, 2004, “Booms, busts, and fraud,” working
paper, University of Minnesota.
[48] Richardson, Scott A., and Richard G. Sloan, 2003, “External financing and future stock
returns,” working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
[49] Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, “A survey of corporate governance,” Journal
of Finance 52, No. 2, 737-783.
[50] Sidak, Gregory J., 2003, “The failure of good intentions: The WorldCom fraud and the
collapse of American telecommunications after deregulation,” Yale Journal on Regulation 20,
207-267.
[51] Stein, Jeremy, 1989, “Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate
behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 655-669.
[52] Sweeney, A.P., 1994,“Debt Covenant Violations and Manager’s Accounting Responses,” Jour-
nal of Accounting and Economics 17, 281-308.
100
[53] Teoh, Siew Hong, Ivo Welch, and T. J. Wong, 1998a, “Earnings management and the post-
issue performance of seasoned equity offerings,” Journal of Financial Economics 50, No. 1
63-99.
[54] Teoh, Siew Hong, Ivo Welch, and T. J. Wong, 1998b, “Earnings management and the long-
term market performance of initial public offerings,” Journal of Finance 53, No. 6, 1935-1974.
101
